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MIDDLEBROOK

—The American Eagle's Nest

By CARL E. PRINCE



REPRINTED FROM EXACT TYPE SET-UP OF THE
SOMERSET MESSENGER-GAZETTE
STARTING JANUARY 23, 1958

SOMERSET PRESS, INC.
Somerville, N. J.

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

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THE ARMY AT MIDDLEBROOK,

1778-1779

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

OF

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY

BY

CARL E. PRINCE

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF

MASTER OF ARTS

NEW BRUNSWICK, NEW JERSEY NOVEMBER, 1957

FOREWORD

The usual, even the fashionable, view taken of local historical societies is that they are groups of elderly people engaged in sedentary horticulture among their family trees. This is said to be occasionally varied by an antiquarian interest reminiscent of Mr. Pickwick at his most enthusiastic pitch. Once a year the horticulturists and antiquarians pause briefly to observe Washington's Birthday,—once again, for Independence Day.

Putting aside the easy rejoinders that there is very little difference between tracing genealogies and pitting one's wits against Philo Vance, and that the small stuff of antiquarianism makes the larger fabric of social history, the concern of the Somerset County Historical Society has been a different one. Somerset County has been marked by significant events from the days of the Indian idols on Hell Mountain (and Beauchamp Plantagenet's hearsay tale of the basalt peak which served as a throning-place) to the establishment of the massive industries which make their segment of modern America.

There is no major reservoir of American history which has been so little known to either scholars or the general public. Here a dozen vanished colonial industries existed in hamlets which still survive on the edges of Exurbia. Here ran (and runs) the Old York Road which bound New York to Philadelphia. At Middlebrook Heights Washington brought into execution, without any battle beyond a minor skirmish, the strategy which drove the British from New Jersey and the middle colonies. Shipyards and freight depots along the Delaware and Raritan Canal served steam packet lines now as forgotten as vanished agricultural railroads. Slave quarters still standing and the little green where Negro murderers were burned at the stake mark one period in the traffic in "strong and likely Negro men and women,"—basement-wall slave cells used on the Underground Railroad another; on a dusty country road a testy sheriff put down a Copperhead rising.

The Society is concerned with learning what it can of the County's history, recording it, preserving its physical evidences, and above all with communicating it to others and interesting them in turn. It is a Society in which shoals of school-children

from the fourth grade up are active, presenting programs of their own and for adults, doing research in manuscript sources, and delivering papers.

From this background one particular physical asset has emerged as especially significant—Middlebrook Heights, on First Watchung Mountain. Its strategic use by Washington, in 1778-1779, as the encampment and strong point of the Continental Armies forbade the British effective use of their forces. At least 300 acres of the encampment are unchanged, except for the erosions of time and growth of a second forest. The heart of the area, some 25 acres, is owned by the Washington Camp Ground Association. A dozen houses occupied by Washington and his generals,—Von Steuben, Greene, Lord Stirling, Knox, and others,—still stand.

It has been the hope of the Association and Society that this core area could be taken over and preserved as a National Historic Site with minimal restoration, by the National Park Service. The fulfilment of such a hope requires a great deal more than patriotic talk, however; it necessitates a careful, scholarly examination of the historical sources to determine the veracity of assertions about it, and the significance of those assertions once they are demonstrated to be fact.

For this purpose, with the help of service clubs, civic organizations, municipalities, and the general public, the Society gathered a fund and presented to Rutgers University the Carle M. Bigelow Fellowship in Local History, to be used for the preparation of a study of Middelbrook Heights as a master's thesis. Mr. Carl Prince, the incumbent of that fellowship, has done a brilliant task of marshalling the sources in this volume. The Society presents his work to the world of history with confidence and pleasure.

Albert S. Davis, Jr.

PREFACE

Somewhere along the way in the study of the Revolution, General Washington's encampment at Middlebrook, New Jersey, has been overlooked. Valley Forge has been worked over many times till every schoolboy is familiar with its history. The Continental Army's encampments at Morristown, New Jersey, have been treated as well. At each of these places there is now a government-sponsored museum, complete with grounds and reconstructed buildings, paying tribute to our Revolutionary heritage.

Why is it then that Camp Middlebrook has been neglected? Certainly the winter encampment of 1778-1779 was as significant as any in terms of size and its effect upon the ultimate outcome of the war. Admittedly there was a good deal less "suffering" than at any previous winter encampment, and to the casual observer this might make Middelbrook somewhat less colorful and therefore less relevant. This thesis is written in the hope that someday the imbalance will be corrected and that Camp Middlebrook also will be recognized for its historic past. When this incident of the Revolution has been placed in its proper setting, it may serve to remind the people of New Jersey of the sacrifices made by their earlier counterparts in the cause of freedom.

I would like to express my deep gratitude to the Somerset County Historical Society, whose grant to Rutgers University made possible the endowment of the Carle E. Bigelow Fellowship, under whose auspices this thesis was written. For many years this fine group has been working diligently toward a final recognition and restoration of the old camping grounds on the Middlebrook.

Finally, I would like in some small way to express my indebtedness to Professor Richard P. McCormick of the Department of History, Rutgers University. It was his kindness and patience, coupled with an extensive knowledge and interest in the subject, that made this thesis possible.

Carl E. Prince

CHAPTER ONE

The Selection of Middlebrook

When General George Washington and the Continental Army encamped at Middlebrook during the Winter of 1778-1779, they had returned "home." Somerset County — and particularly Middlebrook — was not unknown to the Commander-in-Chief and his troops. The Raritan Valley, centrally located in the heart of New Jersey, had always been a fortunate location for the Army during the difficult early years of the war.

This had been especially true in the Spring of 1777. At the end of May, Washington had marched his rundown and much reduced Army from their Winter quarters at Morristown to Middlebrook, a hamlet less than a mile up the Raritan from Bound Brook. The small Army had spent a miserable Winter at Morristown, and morale was at a low ebb.

Strategic Position

Middlebrook at this point provided a strong and defensible position for Washington — a point from which he could watch with safety the British forces in and around New Brunswick, only seven miles away. Activity in the British camp in Jersey had made Washington wary of a possible campaign in the state, and the control of Middlebrook Heights would be of extreme importance in that event. In addition, the fact that the Continental Army was in such close proximity to the British meant that it presented a constant threat to any overland expedition the British might undertake.

General Howe, in command of the British, sought to lure the strongly ensconced Americans from their advantageous position in the mountains into a general engagement. He used the threat of a march upon Philadelphia as the bait for his trap. Washington was not to be bluffed, however, and remained at Middlebrook. The British, after much maneuvering and a few skirmishes, gave up the attempt, and in early July retreated to their New York stronghold.

It was in a mood of hope that Washington led his Army back to Middlebrook in December, 1778. The Summer's campaigns had been favorable to the Continental cause, and the Commander-in-Chief felt that the tide of war had begun to turn in his favor.

Following the battle of Monmouth at the end of June, 1778, the British had retreated across the Jerseys to New York City. Washington and his Army marched to the banks of the Raritan, across the river from New Brunswick, where they recouped their strength. There

the Army celebrated the 4th of July. On July 5, Washington marched his Army by way of Scotch Plains to Newark "on that familiar road so often trod by them either in retreat or in advance," and on to Haverstraw, New York (1). They reached Haverstraw around July 15, and encamped on the plains, watching the British in New York and waiting.

Instructions

Meanwhile, during that Summer of 1778, the French fleet had arrived, accompanied by an army of 4,000 French troops. They lay off Rhode Island, supposedly at the disposition of General John Sullivan, who was engaging the British around Newport. But Sullivan's disagreement with the French commander, Comte Charles Hector D'Estaing, and the dismal failure sustained in attempting to capture the British garrison in Newport, created an aura of discord and disappointment in the States that Summer.

This incident was the only blemish to mar the outlook of Washington and his men. The Continental Army in the Summer of 1778 was at the peak of its strength, and Washington could not but be satisfied that after three years of war the British had not strategically advanced their position in their efforts to quell the rebellion. With his Army at full strength, Washington moved from Haverstraw to Kings Ferry, and thence to White Plains on July 18 and 19. It still puzzled Washington and his staff, however, that the British should be content to remain in New York(2).

General Staff

The command of the troops at White Plains underwent a rearrangement in September, 1778. William Alexander of New Jersey, who as the claimant to a Scottish earldom persisted in titling himself Lord Stirling, was placed in command of the Virginia line, with General Israel Putnam being transferred to the command of the Massachusetts division. In addition, Generals Horatio Gates, Anthony Wayne, Benjamin Lincoln, Baron Johanne DeKalb, and Alexander McDougall each now commanded a division.

The divisions of Wayne, Stirling, and DeKalb were to encamp for the Winter at Middlebrook almost three months later.

Winter approached, and the uncertainty grew as to the intentions of the British in New York. September passed, and as the middle of October was approaching, Washington could wait no longer. He had to choose a Winter encampment for his Army. The danger to the well-being of the Army increased, for time was needed to prepare a camp for the men. Finally, on October 14, 1778, Washington acted. He wrote to his General Staff:

> I have been waiting impatiently for the movements of the enemy to come to an issue that might ascertain their intentions for the Winter, which had hitherto prevented my taking the present step; but the uncertainty in which they still continue involved, and the advanced Season of the year,

> will no longer admit of delay in fixing upon a plan for the general disposition of the Army in Winter quarters. In determining this, it will readily occur to you that the following particulars are to be considered. The security of the Army itself, its subsistence and accommodation, the protection of the Country, the support of our important posts, the relation which ought to be preserved with the French Fleet should it remain where it is, depending on the degree of probability of a Winter operation against it, and the succour it may derive from the troops under General Sullivan and the Militia of the country.(3)

Numerous other cogent factors entered into the choice of quarters for the Army for the Winter. Should the Army be quartered as a unit? If divided, should it be distributed into cantonments? In what manner and how soon should it enter Winter quarters? What precautions should be taken with respect to provisions and forage? And most importantly, where was the Army to be quartered? What place would best solve the strategic problems posed by the British in New York?(4) Washington knew that these pertinent questions had to be answered satisfactorily to avoid the bitter experience of another Valley Forge. The greatest single factor was stated clearly by James McHenry, Washington's aide: "The cantonment of the main army will depend . . . on the strength which the enemy may keep up at New York." (5)

October 29 found the Commander-in-Chief and his generals formulating a final plan. Tentatively, two or three brigades each were to establish Winter quarters at Danbury, West Point, and Middlebrook. But,

> should [the enemy] . . . contrary to appearances and our expectations, r e m a i n there [New York] with their whole force, ours must be in proportion upon the North River; but should they send off the detachment which is now embarked, we may safely remove a greater number to Middlebrook, than we would otherwise have done. (6)

On the same day, Washington made his most significant decision. He was going to divide the Army in three as originally planned, but not equally. The greater part was to camp at Middlebrook.

Choice of Middlebrook

Washington chose Middlebrook for a number of reasons. He knew the area to be easily defensible. Middlebrook was centrally located both with respect to watching the enemy in New York and defending the countryside so desperately i n need of protection from the British. Finally, the people on the whole were friendly, and this consideration counted for much in reckoning that the Army must live off the land. On November 24, it became apparent that the British were not going to evacuate New York. But the Conti-

nentals were about to march to Middlebrook, and Washington did not change his plans. The major part of the Army took up its march to Middlebrook a few days later to encamp for the Winter.

When Washington, in council with his generals, proposed his plan for a Winter encampment, most of his general staff were in substantial agreement. Only one dissented; as early as October 26, Lord Stirling sounded a prophetic and discouraging note. He had made inquiry into the state of the forage in New Jersey and found that it was "absolutely impracticable to maintain the Army in flower [sic] and grain in any situation on the east side of Hudson's river."(7)

Stirling wanted to divide the Army into smaller units than Washington thought feasible. He would place a division in Scotch Plains or Middlebrook, and divide the remainder of the Army, a brigade to a town, throughout New Jersey. This would make it easier for the Army to live off the land insofar as forage was concerned.(8) Washington, however, rejected this suggestion and adhered to his original plan of placing the bulk of the troops in New Jersey at Middlebrook.

As soon as Middlebrook had been chosen as the main encampment for the Army, Washington set in motion plans for preparing the camp for his troops. There is evidence that he had learned a lesson from his bitter experience the previous Winter, for he wrote: "The distress to which we were reduced last Winter at Valley Forge, for want of a proper magazine, makes me extremely desirous to see such a one established in time."(9) This, then, was the first order of business, and the establishment of a magazine at Camp Middlebrook was well under way by the end of October or the beginning of November. Twice during the early part of November huge quantities of supplies were forwarded to camp from Philadelphia.(10)

If the food situation seemed to be well in hand, the question of forage, to crop up again and again throughout the Winter, was plaguing the Army even at this early date. General Nathanael Greene, the Quartermaster General for the Army, noted that hay was scarce, and the shortage of wheat was such that it was doubtful whether it could be considered for use as forage at all.(11)

Begin Building Huts

Immediate attention was given to the matter of constructing the rude huts in which the Army was to spend the Winter. On October 29, Washington warned Greene of the necessity of reconnoitering proper positions for hutting, "and for collecting Boards, Stone and such materials as are requisite to make Barracks comfortable."(12) By November 23, the tools necessary for hutting were all at Middlebrook.(13) The following week, on November 29, General Greene arrived at camp to "fix upon a place for hutting."(14) Evidently the initial preparations in camp had slowed down considerably by the end of November, for Greene was somewhat discouraged by the situa-

tion he found at Middlebrook. On December 4, he wrote:

> On my arrival here I find little in preparation made for the accommodation of the Army, but I am told materials are coming in from all quarters, and am in hope in a few days a great plenty will be collected. Forage and Provisions are very scarce, greater will be necessary to get us a seasonable supply.(15)

The Army was due to begin arriving in a few days, however, and time was running out.

The troops consigned to Middlebrook included a division each from Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, and a regiment of Delaware troops attached to the Virginia line.

The Corps of Artillery was to encamp at Pluckemin, about seven miles from Middlebrook.

The Virginia Division was composed of three brigades under the command of Brigadier Generals Charles Scott, William Woodford, and Peter Muhlenberg.

General Scott's bridgade included the 4th, 6th, and 8th Virginia regiments, the regiment of Delaware troops, and Colonel William Grayson's semi-independent regiment attached to the Virginia line.(16)

General Woodford's brigade was made up of the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 7th, and 11th Virginia regiments.(17)

Finally, General Muhlenberg's brigade composed of the 1st and 10th Virginia regiments, and the 1st and 2nd Virginia State regiments, completed the division.(18)

On May 12, 1779, the Virginia line was consolidated into two brigades instead of the original three, for the number of Virginia troops had decreased over the Winter due to an expiration of enlistments and a lack of new recruits. The following Virginia regiments were united: the 3rd and 4th, and the 5th and 11th. These, combined with the 2nd, 7th, and 8th regiments, now composed General Woodford's brigade.

The 1st and 10th and Colonel Grayson's and Colonel Nathaniel Gist's regiments were also combined, and together with the 6th Virginia and the 1st and 2nd Virginia State regiments, comprised General Muhlenberg's new brigade.

The Delaware regiment was assigned to the Maryland Division in camp, and General Scott was relieved of his command in the Virginia line.(19)

General Wayne's Command

The Pennsylvania Division was composed of two brigades. The first, under the command of "Mad Anthony" Wayne, comprised the 1st, 2nd, 7th, and 10th Pennsylvania regiments. (20) General Wayne was in temporary command of the division, but in February he relinquished his command to Major General Arthur St. Clair. The second brigade was commanded by General William Irvine, and included the 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 9th Pennsylvania regiments.(21)

The third division at Middlebrook that Winter was made up of Maryland troops. One brigade

was commanded by General William Smallwood and incorporated the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 7th Maryland regiments. The other Maryland brigade was composed of the 2nd, 4th, and 6th regiments to which was added the Delaware regiment in May, 1779, (22) This brigade was under the temporary command of Colonel Josias Hall. Its permanent leader, Brigadier General Mordecai Gist, was absent on leave till early Spring. (23*)

The number of troops in each brigade, fluctuated depending on circumstances such as illness, furlough, or enlistments. For instance, in January, 1779, there were reported on the muster rolls 8,875 troops in all at Middlebrook. Actually, if the number sick, those on furlough, and those on command as pickets outside the camp were subtracted, only 4,738 remained in camp.

The total figure given in the muster rolls also varied. As seen above, there were 9,175 in camp in January. By the end of March the number of men had shrunk to 7,029. With the arrival of new recruits and the men who had been on furlough the total number swelled to 9,804 by the end of April. These figures would decrease in about the same proportion as previously if we subtracted those sick or on command.(24)

The Virginia troops left Robinson's Landing near West Point on November 28. The Pennsylvania Division left its camp at Fredericksburg, New York, at "about the same time." Accompanying the Pennsylvania line were the Park of Artillery destined for Pluckemin, the magazine stores, and the Flying Hospital.(25) The Maryland troops, quartered at Fishkill, "waited some days longer, as they covered the march of the Convention troops."(26)

The Convention troops were those British and Hessian soldiers who surrendered to General Horatio Gates following the Battle of Saratoga, October 16, 1777. The Marylanders under DeKalb marched the Convention troops as far as Chester, New Jersey, arriving there on December 7. On that date, Washington deemed the prisoners safe from British rescue and ordered DeKalb to march his troops to Middlebrook. (27)

Wayne's Pennsylvanians received their marching orders on November 25 but were detained near camp a few days for they had to check on the progress of the troublesome Convention troops crossing the North [Hudson] River. A party of 50 was detached from the Pennsylvania line to keep the British prisoners from deserting, and the Pennsylvanians then resumed their march to Middlebrook about November 28.(28)

British Threat

If all had gone well, the majority of troops destined for Middlebrook would have arrived around the end of November or the beginning of December. However, the British suddenly threatened the American line of march. On December 4, Washington was informed that 52 vessels with a great number of British troops had embarked from New

York and were sailing up the Hudson River. The American general staff wondered if this British activity on a grand scale was just a feint or the beginning of the long-awaited movement to the West Indies.

The American Commander had to consider other possibilities also. The British might be moving on West Point, or perhaps they were going to attempt a rescue of the Saratoga Convention troops. A third alternative, but one which Washington did not consider likely, was the possibility that the enemy, with the aid of their fleet, was going to attempt to interrupt the American line of march. The General concluded that the British were going to attack West Point, and hastily ordered the troops at Danbury under General Putnam to re-enforce the Highlands. Washington was en route to Middlebrook, and had already reached Elizabethtown, but with the British movement, he left Elizabethtown for West Point.(29)

The British threat against West Point appeared to subside on December 6, however, and Washington ordered his Army to resume its march to camp, and not a moment too soon. For in fact, the British had undertaken a daring plan whereby a detachment of British light corps under Captain Caldwell was to attempt to cut Washington's marching Army in half. Evidently, the great British fleet was a bluff — an attempt to halt the American troop movements long enough to make possible an attack on the Continentals at their most vulnerable point — the point where the Army had to cross the Hudson at Kings Ferry. There, with the main body of troops on one side of the Hudson River, and all the baggage and the small rear guard waiting to be transported across on the other side, the British would have the Americans as yet unembarked at their mercy.

The British plan, daring and imaginative as it was, did not work. An account of it was found in a British intelligence report to General Sir Henry Clinton, the British Commander in North America:

> Notwithstanding the [British] troops were embarked on the 2nd [December] at night, and that Captain Caldwell exerted himself as much as possible, they did not arrive at Verplanks Point before the 5th. This delay gave time for every kind of baggage to remove from thence before our arrival [at Kings Ferry], and the Rear Guard of the Enemy was beyond our reach, having passed [Hudson] River on the 7th.(30)

Close Call

The Continental Army had escaped the British trap by a hair's breadth. Had the American baggage and rear guard been captured, it would have been a telling blow, not only in terms of actual loss, but the damage to morale as well.

The sudden halt of the Army did, however, wreak havoc with the Quartermaster Department. As one assistant quartermaster wrote: "Great inconvenience arises from Brigades being stopped on the Road, and

part of their loading being taken out, detention and loss of several articles is one amongst others."(31)

On December 9, the Virginia troops arrived at Middlebrook and started hutting soon after.(32) Since the Maryland troops left Chester, N. J., on December 7, they must have arrived in camp at about the same time.(33) The enemy's movements had delayed the Pennsylvania line a good deal longer than the others, since most of the baggage of the Army was under their care. The Pennsylvanians were the last to reach camp. They probably arrived about the middle of December, and thereby lost some valuable hutting time, much to their later discomfort.(34)

Meanwhile, General Washington had arrived at Elizabethtown on December 2, but the British movements caused him to leave for the Highlands. He returned to Elizabethtown on December 7, and stayed till the 10th, when he left for Middlebrook, arriving there the next day.(35) By December 10, the British had excellent intelligence reports of the General's whereabouts, and the potential situation of the troops at Middlebrook.(36)

The remainder of the Continental Army was divided for the coming winter according to a plan of defense devised by General Washington and his staff. General Alexander McDougall was ordered to the Highlands of New York to take command of all posts on the North River from Poughkeepsie downwards.

Three Massachusetts brigades under Generals John Nixon, John Patterson, and Ebenezer Larned were placed under McDougall's command, as was the garrison at West Point. West Point was of prime importance to the Army, for that post they controlled the upper reaches of the North River.(37) Since McDougall's force was small as compared to the task it faced, it was kept as flexible as possible. The three brigades were to be posted at the discretion of McDougall, or as circumstances required, at three places — West Point, Fishkill, and Fredericksburg. General Headquarters for this area was to be at Fishkill, which was centrally located for the purpose.(38)

The rest of the Continental troops were sent to Danbury, Conn., under General Putnam. His force consisted of three brigades of Connecticut and New Hampshire troops, commanded respectively by Generals Enoch Poor, Samuel Parsons, and Ebenezer Huntington.(39) These units were responsible for the protection of the Connecticut-New Hampshire area, below Rhode Island (where General Sullivan was stationed with his Army), and were also able to afford protection to the magazines being built along the Connecticut River.(40) Count Pulaski and his cavalry corps were posted at the Minisink settlement on the Delaware River as near to Cole's Fort as possible.(41)

The New Jersey brigade under General William Maxwell encamped at Elizabethtown.

The brigade was composed of three regiments commanded respectively by Colonels William Shreve, Matthias Ogden, and Elias Dayton, and was to provide protection to the lower portions of New Jersey.(42)

Finally, the North Carolina brigade was stationed at Smith's Clove, N. Y., not far from Paramus, N. J. The brigade divided its time between the two places. It was cammanded by Colonel Thomas Clark, and its primary task was to secure the upper reaches of New Jersey. (43)

This network of encampments provided a strong defense against possible British attack. Also, with the Army so divided, it was infinitely easier to supply them properly with forage and food, since to some extent they were able to live off the land. The troops at Danbury were close enough to the Highlands posts to provide reserve strength ii it should prove necessary. The posts at Elizabethtown and Smith's Clove were able to afford the same coverage. These latter, in turn, were protected by the troops at Middlebrook. The encampments then, were interdependent, and the general headquarters for these was at Middlebrook.

CHAPTER TWO

Location of the Camp

In 1778, the Raritan Valley was sparsely settled. Somerset County's population barely totaled 10,000 inhabitants, or about as many residents as there were soldiers at Middlebrook. There were a few towns and villages, but on the whole, the population was rural in nature, with many small farms and not a few estates belonging to the landed gentry. Thus, when an Army of approximately 10,000 men marched into the valley for the Winter, they found that a good deal of ingenuity would have to be used in order to house satisfactorily the many components of the Army.

There were no barracks already completed for the rank and file. For the most part, the various additional units had to shift for themselves in finding quarters. The same was true for many officers. There just were not enough buildings in the area suitable for the Army and available to it. A glance at the map will indicate the lack of consistency in the end result. Military units established their headquarters to answer their individual needs, and like Topsy, Camp Middlebrook "just growed."

Bound Brook and Middlebrook, the two principal campsites for the Army, were but tiny villages in 1778. Both had seen more than their share of the war. Both had played host at various times to British and American troops, for the towns were near the heart of the Watchung Mountain Range, and therefore of great strategic importance. Bound Brook was situated in the fertile valley below First Mountain, at the junction of the Raritan River and Bound Brook. Middlebrook was a scant mile away in the same valley, at the point where the Middlebrook flows into the Raritan. Bound Brook served as the hub for the agricultural pursuits of the valley, and by 1778 had developed into a thriving little community.

Because circumstances demanded that each unit fend for itself, each of the three divisions of troops that arrived at Middlebrook went its own way, within the confines of sound defensive principles. Two of the divisions, comprising the troops of the Virginia and Maryland lines, camped near one another below First Mountain on either side of the Middlebrook. Together they made up the main encampment of the Army. The Pennsylvania division was located across the Raritan, near the Millstone River.

The Virginia and Maryland divisions occupied distinctly separate sites. Joseph Clark, a private soldier in the New Jersey Brigade, noted in his diary: "the Virginia, Maryland [and]

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Delaware. . . troops were appointed to camp under the First Mountain, back of Middlebrook." (1) In a false spy letter designed to alarm the British, Washington passed on some accurate information to the enemy. The British probably had the intelligence already, so General Washington lost nothing.(2) The letter read in part: "Mr. Starling [Stirling] and General Kables [DeKalb] are upon the [First] mountain over Bound Brook."(3) The homespun spelling was employed to make the letter more believable.

According to Benson Lossing, who visited the campsite in the 1840's, the Army was hutted "on the gentle slope from the plain to the steep acclivities of the [First] mountain in the rear of Middlebrook." One of the encampments, according to Lossing, was about three-quarters of a mile from Bound Brook.(4) Lossing gleaned this information by speaking to those older inhabitants of Somerset County who remembered back to the day when the Army was at Middlebrook. Finally, General DeKalb was asked by Washington to submit a plan for the defense of Camp Middlebrook, and, in responding, DeKalb proposed placing fortifications "along the top of the [First] mountain, behind the camp as far as Wayne's Gap."(5) According to these general sources, then, the two divisions comprising the main encampment were located near First Mountain behind Bound Brook, with some huts located on the slope of the mountain, and the rest extending downward to the level plain below.

Steele's Tavern

In ascertaining just where on First Mountain the Army was situated, we have recourse to some significant references to "Steele's Tavern," and "Steele's Gap." "Steele" is sometimes spelled "Stelle," and the latter spelling is probably correct. "Steele's" or "Stelle's Gap" refers to the gap in First Mountain caused by the flow of the Middlebrook. The tavern was located on the Pluckemin road about a mile from the junction of Old York Road (see map), and was well known throughout the county. As a matter of fact, it was something of a landmark in colonial Somerset County.

The Stelle family who owned the tavern had long resided in the Raritan Valley, dating as far back as the 17th Century. At the time the Army was at Middlebrook, Stelle's Tavern was run by Adrian Manley, in the employ of the Stelle family. (6) Many times while the Army was at Middlebrook, orders were issued by the officers forbidding the men in camp to visit Stelle's Tavern and others like it. Obviously, it was a landmark for the Army as well as the inhabitants.

As early as November 30, 1778, the area around Stelle's Tavern was considered as a possible camp site. General Greene came to camp early to survey the situation, and wrote to Washington: "I shall immediately go out to take a view of the ground toward Steele's Tavern to fix upon a place for hutting." (7) An advertisement appeared in the Pennsylvania

Packet after the Army had left Middlebrook, announcing that a land sale was to be held

> on Monday the first day of November next (1779) at the house commonly called Stell's Tavern near the Virginia encampment, at or near Middlebrook. (8)

On March 23, 1779, General Washington ordered that signals be erected at "Steele's Gap and the Hill upon Baskenridge Road." These were to be built by details from Generals Woodford's and Scott's brigades of the Virginia line. (9) It was the custom to have troops nearest the location undertake the construction of the necessary signals. We may thus conclude from these references that the Virginia Division of the main encampment was in close proximity to Steele's Gap.

The Maryland Division of the main encampment was located somewhat south of the Virginia troops, close to Bound Brook and Middlebrook proper. A pioneer from each Maryland brigade was assigned to cut wood for General Louis DuPortail, chief of engineers at Camp Middlebrook. General DuPortail had his headquarters in Middlebrook, just west of Bound Brook. (10) Because men from the Maryland line were assigned the task, it can be assumed that they were closest to Bound Brook, below First Mountain. Similarly, a guard for General DuPortail was taken from among the Maryland troops on May 24, 1779. (11)

A guard for the town of Bound Brook was also taken from the Maryland line. On December 24, 1778, General Smallwood ordered that a 20-man picket, under the command of a sergeant, be posted at Bound Brook, to be relieved every 48 hours. (12) On January 29, 1779, this picket was increased to 48 men, to be relieved every two days. (13) The fact that this number of men were relieved so frequently implies that the Maryland Division was in close proximity to Bound Brook. Finally, General Smallwood's brigade of Maryland troops was ordered to erect signals at "Wayne's, Lincoln's and Quibbletown gaps." (14) A glance at the map will readily show that these signal locations were closest to the Maryland line.

Washington's Mapmaker

A British spy map of the Middlebrook encampment correctly places the two divisions comprising the main cantonment below First Mountain, north of Bound Brook, in the vicinity of Steel's Gap.(15) But from other sources we can ascertain that, though substantially correct, the map placed the Maryland Division west of the Middlebrook, whereas it was actually east of it. This is clearly shown in the Erskine maps of the Middlebrook area made during the Revolutionary period. Robert Erskine was General Washington's official cartographer, and the General himself considered Erskine's maps accurate.(16) One of Erskine's maps traces a road between Middlebrook and Bound Brook, which ran north from the Old York Road (see map), east of the Middlebrook. The road is marked "to the Middlebrook

Valley past the Maryland Camp." (17).

In summarizing the location of the main encampment of Camp Middlebrook, the Maryland Division of Washington's Army was east of the Middlebrook, below First Mountain. The Virginia Division was near Steele's Gap, west of the Middlebrook and on the slopes of First Mountain. In relative terms, the Maryland Division was encamped south or below the Virginia Division, closer to Bound Brook. Erskine located Steele's Tavern — which figured so prominently in the correspondence relating to the Middlebrook encampment — as being southwest of Steele's Gap. (18)

In terms of present-day locations, the Virginia troops would be located near Chimney Rock (19) (southeast of Steele's Gap), with the Maryland troops approximately south of them, about halfway between Chimney Rock and present-day Bound Brook.

A part of the main encampment was situated on rough and hilly land. As the huts were being built, ditches were ordered dug beside the rows of huts so that water would drain off. This would indicate that the Virginia troops were situated on the sloping terrain of First Mountain. (20) The spy letter mentioned previously also refers to the troops as being "upon the slope of the mountain," (21) and Lossing's Field Book of the Revolution placed the main encampment on "the gentle slope" of First Mountain.(22) While building the huts was made more difficult by the slope, drainage became less of a problem because of it, and certainly the position was easily defended against attack.

The location of the Pennsylvania line at Middlebrook that Winter was mapped by Erskine.(23) It was on the west side of the Millstone road that ran south from the Old York Road near Somerville today, to Princeton, about a mile and a half, southwest of the junction of the Raritan and Millstone Rivers. This would place the camp at about where the town of Weston is today.(24) More exactly, the troops occupied the land that is now west of Main Street in present-day Weston, including Whalen and Okna Streets, and ending at about French Street.

The division was situated across the Raritan River from the main camp, "near Van Ness's Bridge."(25) Van Ness's Bridge was synonymous with Van Veghten's or Greene's Bridge. A local tradition has it that "during the Winter of 1778-1779 an entire division of the American Army was quartered on the Van Veghten possessions." (26) The number of troops mentioned is an exaggeration, but at least a brigade of Pennsylania troops was quartered on the Van Veghten lands. (27) The Pennsylvania line, then, formed a camp apart from the main body of troops, and indeed, was almost an entity in itself. It had arrived late and consequently was assigned the least likely of the campsites chosen by General Greene. This accounts for its being so far removed from the main body of

troops. At any rate, it was the Pennsylvanians who were to experience the most trying hardships that Winter at Middlebrook.

The artillery brigade, meanwhile, had arrived at the beginning of December at Pluckemin, about seven miles northwest of the main campsite. There they encamped for the Winter, a part of the Middlebrook encampment, yet isolated from it. In their charge were all the fieldpieces belonging to the state lines at Middlebrook except for the few that were used for the camp's defenses. Since they were for all practical purposes a separate unit of the Continental Army, their story is best told in a separate chapter.

There were various elements of Camp Middlebrook scattered throughout the Raritan Valley. These components were military units present in camp in addition to the actual fighting force, and all were necessary to the welfare of the Army. They established their headquarters at locations most suited to their individual needs. As has been noted, there was little order or cohesion in the pattern that those units established. The Raritan Valley was sparsely settled, and adequate facilities for the Army in a centralized and compact area were not available, for there was a scarcity of suitable buildings. Thus, the Army was well dispersed throughout the Valley.

The Artificers' Camp under the command of Colonel Jedu-than Baldwin was located on the north side of the Old York Road, a mile or so west of the Van Horne House.(28) If we were to superimpose the camp on a map of present-day Somerset County, the camp would occupy Grand Boulevard, just north of Somerset Avenue [Easton Turnpike] encompassing approximately Oak and Pine Streets, just outside Somerville. Four wood frame buildings in that area were used by the artificers. Wagons, tents, and camp equipage were brought to the artificers for repair, and here too preparations were in progress for the opening of the next campaign.

Many miles up the road, not far from the Artillery Park at Pluckemin, was the Clothier's Office. Erskine located it near the Ten Eyck home, at the juncture of the Lamington River and the North Branch of the Raritan.(29) The property in recent years belonged to Abraham Ten Eyck. Here much needed uniforms from France were delivered, and the regimental quartermasters beat a steady path to the Clothier General's door to receive the new issues of uniforms for their men when new clothing was available.

The Post Office for Camp Middlebrook was located about a half mile east of Washington's headquarters at the Wallace House. It was on the north side of the Old York Road in the vicinity of Tunison's Tavern. (30) Today, the same building, if still standing, would be in Somerville on East Main Street, between North Bridge and North Grove Streets, on the north side of the street. The Postmaster for the Army for part of the Winter was Hugh Smith.(31)

The Commissary Department, under the command of Royal Flint, the Army's Assistant Commissary General of Purchase, was at Raritan, near Somerville. (32) The Slaugterhouse for the camp was not too far from the Maryland line, near Bound Brook. (33) Today, the slaughterhouse would be right in the heart of town. It was located so close to town because a good many of the local civilians were employed there.(34) Here the Army's cattle, brought from many parts of the country, were slaughtered to feed the troops. The Slaughterhouse, like other adjuncts of the camp that Winter, was under the supervision of a civilian employe, William Johnes.(35)

Quartermaster's Stores

The Commissary of Hides was located in Bound Brook proper. (36) This department was commanded by John Mehelm, a Colonel and Quartermaster General of the New Jersey Militia. (37) The Quartermaster's stores were at Bound Brook also, under the supervision of another civilian, Jacob Weiss. The Army had requisitioned the use of two buildings in town to house these stores.(38) The Army's camp equipage was located on the road opposite General Greene's quarters at the Van Veghten House.(39) These various components — the Commissary and Quartermaster's Departments the Slaughterhouse, and the various camp equipage — were all under the over-all command of Major General Nathanael Greene, the Quartermaster General of the Army.

The horses necessary to the operation of the encampment were kept at the Horse Corral, located about "two miles this side of Pluckemin," in the direction of camp.(40) The Corral would now be on the Somerville road, just about one-sixth of a mile below Harding Road, near where State Highway 206 becomes Somerville Road. There were relatively few horses in camp due to the critical state of forage. Only those absolutely necessary to the needs of the Army were kept. (41) John Church, another civilian employe was in charge of the Corral.(42)

The Forage Magazine for the Army was built at Raritan, and was under the immediate command of Colonel Clement Biddle, the Foragemaster General for the Army.(43) The Horse Corral and the Forage Magazine were also part of the Quartermaster Department, under General Greene.

The Commissary General of Prisoners, John Beatty, also had his headquarters at Raritan. The guardhouse, where those soldiers under arrest were kept, was probably at Raritan too, since it was under Beatty's jurisdiction.(44)

Finally, there were two hospitals serving the camp. Both were under the general command of Dr. George Draper.(45) One hospital was located at Somerset Court House (now Millstone), where three barns were requisitioned from the inhabitants for the use of the Army.(46) The other hospital was in New Brunswick, under the

immediate command of Colonel Abraham Buford.(47)

When Camp Middlebrook was occupied in December, 1778, most of the officers took up quarters outside of camp, usually in private homes in the vicinity of Middlebrook and Bound Brook. As huts were completed, more and more of these officers were ordered to report back to camp to live with their regiments. Only officers of field grade were permitted to reside outside of camp after the soldiery was hutted. Many top-ranking officers thus became permanent residents in the homes of some of the more prominent families of Somerset County for the duration of the Army's stay at Middlebrook.

General Arthur St. Clair, who replaced General Wayne as commander of the Pennsylvania line in February, was quartered just south of his troops on the Millstone Road, about where Kupper's Airport is now.(48) The house is no longer standing. Toward the end of April, 1779, General Sullivan came to camp to discuss with the General Staff plans for the proposed Indian Expedition against the Six Nations. While at Middlebrook, he was the guest of General St. Clair. He remained in camp about a week.(49)

Baron von Steuben

Baron Frederick von Steuben, the newly promoted Inspector General of the Army, was quartered at the home of Abraham Staats in South Bound Brook.(50) The house is still standing, and is known as the LaTourette House. The Baron entertained many distinguished visitors during his stay in Somerset County.

Baron DeKalb, in command of the Maryland troops, was quartered not far from the bridge that spanned the Raritan, just south of Bound Brook.(51) DeKalb's headquarters was about a quarter of a mile up the road from the Staats House, on the same side of the road. Today it would stand not far from the Washington Street intersection in South Bound Brook. The Baron, like St. Clair, was thus able to remain close to his troops.

Lord Stirling, in permanent command of the Virginia line and second-in-command to General Washington, was quartered for the Winter at the home of Philip Van Horne, on "Phil's Hill," on the Old York Road west of the Middlebrook.(52) His wife and daughter Kitty were with the General at Van Horne's. Today the house still stands on the hill near the Calco Circle, outside of Bound Brook. "Light, Horse Harry" Lee, the father of Robert E. Lee, was quartered with Stirling at the Van Horne house also. He was not a permanent resident, however, for he spent much of his time with his cavalry corps posted outside of camp in southern New Jersey, because of the lack of forage in camp. Indeed, the forage situation was such that Lee's corps was the only cavalry to spend the Winter of 1778-1779 in the state.(53)

General Nathanael Greene and his wife resided for the Winter at the home of Derrick Van Veghten. The house in Revolutionary times was located south of the Old York Road

[Easton Turnpike]. Today it still stands about three-quarters of a mile south of the Old York Road, about halfway between the road and the bend of the Raritan River, West of Finderne. Greene's vivacious wife was a main attraction of the social season and entertained many of the notables who visited camp that Winter.(54)

There were other general officers in camp also. General Louis DuPortail, in command of the recently-conceived Engineers' Division (better known perhaps as "sappers and miners"), was quartered at a Mr. Baker's in Middlebrook. His division was as yet non-existent, and he "borrowed" his engineers from the various state lines when necessary.(55)

Brigadier General Mordecai Gist had his Winter quarters in Bound Brook.(56)

Brigadier General William Woodford of the Virginia line resided at the home of a Mr. Pernise, also at Bound Brook.(57)

The Adjutant General of the Army, Alexander Scammell, was housed near Van Middleswort Island on the Raritan River. (58) The Island is no longer in existence.

There were others in camp whose exact quarters are unknown. George Olney was the Auditor for the Army at Middlebrook, and it is not known where his headquarters was. (59) Henry Rutgers, Jr., and Azariah Horton were appointed Deputy Commissary Generals of Musters by the Continental Congress on April 15, 1779, but their quarters are also unknown.(60)

Those officers who sought quarters outside of camp found that suitable accommodations were scarce indeed. Somerset County was not populous in Revolutionary days, and comfortable houses convenient to camp were few and far between. Even the Commander-in-Chief, General Washington, had to settle for quarters which were some distance from camp, because there were none more suitable to his needs in the immediate area around Camp Middlebrook. There is substantial evidence that this early day housing shortage created a good deal of animosity among the officers of the Army.

Chaplain Moved to Rear

Colonel Beatty, the Commissary General of Prisoners, for example, arrived in camp later than most of the officers, and his plight was typical:

> Business preventing my coming to Camp at the time Headquarters was fixed at Middlebrook, the Gentlemen of the Army improved their early arrival at this ground in procuring for quarters all the Houses in the vicinity of Camp general Head Quarters; The Duty of my Office requiring a constant attendance to the Commander-in-Chief, I cannot find within the Circuit of several miles any House convenient.(61)

Beatty had a handy solution to the problem, however. He saw a house that he liked which was being occupied by the Rev. Alexander Balmain, a chaplain in the Virginia line, and a minister of some note in Fred-

erick County, Maryland for 30 years following the war.(62) Beatty suggested that General Greene have Balmain "removed to a greater distance. . . wherin he might be equally well accommodated."(63) The Rev. Balmain's reaction to this suggestion has not been recorded for posterity.

General William Woodford was another who had his housing troubles, in the form of a conflict with the chief of the Express Riders, Joseph Dunn. According to Woodford, Dunn had "returned with his horses" to Mr. Pernise's house, where Dunn had formerly been quartered. This was "very disagreeable" to Woodford, who felt that Dunn had returned just to revenge himself upon Woodford, for "being turned out of such comfortable quarters to give place to me."(64) Obviously, General Greene, who was called upon to arbitrate these differences, had a difficult time of it.

As has been noted, General Washington had been detained at Elizabethtown because of the threat posed by the British. He finally arrived at his old camp on the Middlebrook on December 11, 1778. Certainly it would have been a much more pleasant winter for him had he gone to Philadelphia while the Army remained in winter quarters, but he preferred to remain with his men.

Washington could not find a building suitable to his purposes in the vicinity of Middlebrook. He chose instead to establish headquarters at the Wallace House on the outskirts of Somerville. Besides being spacious and accommodating, the Wallace House was behind the army, thus insuring Washington's safety from enemy capture. The house still stands at today at 38 Washington place, Somerville.(65)

The Wallace House, according to one biographer, would have been more comfortable had it not been so crowded.(66) Martha Washington had come to camp to spend the winter with her husband, and Washington's aides-de-camp, Alexander Hamilton, James McHenry, and Tench Tilghman, were living at Wallace's as well.(67) Hamilton was to gain fame as Washington's Secretary of the Treasury years later. McHenry, a doctor by profession, was also to rise to prominence as the Secretary of War in John Adams' cabinet. Tilghman was to die at an early age. The three shared a small bedroom in the rear of the house. (68)

Besides these, a Mrs. Thompson was also quartered there for awhile, probably on a visit. There were numerous other visitors in the house throughout the winter.(69) Dinner was always a ceremonious affair with the Washingtons, and usually many notable officers of the Army were in attendance. Sometimes as many as 30 people were present for dinner. Colonels Hamilton and McHenry usually presided at the table.(70)

When they arrived, the Washingtons found that in order to entertain properly much would

be needed at the Wallace House that was not there. Consequently, Washington had a deputy quartermaster general locate such things as silver, china, and table linen and forward these to camp.(71) Upon establishing residence, Washington paid Wallace a thousand dollars for the use of the house as headquarters.

Washington's 'Life Guard'

General Washington's "Life Guard" remained close to their commander that Winter. They built their huts at Raritan, not far from the Wallace home.(72) There was a detachment from this regiment on duty at headquarters at all times. As a matter of fact, one of the soldiers, a private in the Guard named Elijah Fisher, worked for Wallace in his spare time. Fisher left us a rather homely description of his "bargain" with Mr. Wallace:

> I makes an agreament with Mr. J. Wallais for to clear a peace of Land for him, the Condishons are as follows, I was to clear so much land fitt for mooing and in fullfiling my oblegation Mr. Wallais was to give me one hundred Dollars Paper Currincy but if Head Quarters moved before I had finished it he was to Pay me for what I had Dun according agreament.(73) Headquarters did move before Elijah finished his work, so he made only 80 dollars.(74)

On December 22, 1778, Washington had to leave camp to go to Philadelphia and wait upon Congress. General Stirling took over the command of the camp, and served as temporary commander until Washington's return to Middlebrook on February 5, 1779.(75)

Washington and his staff were not happy in Philadelphia, away from the Army. Tench Tilghman, who accompanied the General, summed up their feelings:

> I suppose you think we must be, by this time, so wedded to Sweet Philadelphia that it will break our hearts to leave it. Far from it I assure you my friend. I can speak for myself and am pretty certain I can answer for all, when I say, that we anxiously wait for the moment that gives us liberty to return to humble Middlebrook.(76)

Besides the personal dislike Washington and his staff held for Philadelphia, there was a better reason for returning. Washington addressed Congress:

> I am in some dilemma with respect to the propriety of my continuing in the City. . . my stay here will become peculiarly ineligible, if an offensive should be preferred. I submit to the Committee whether the other matters may not be as well transacted by letter from Camp as by remaining here.(77)

Washington hastened through his business at Philadelphia, and left there on February 2. He reached camp on February 5, and resumed his command of the Army.(78) He remained with the Army for the remainder of their stay at Middlebrook.

CHAPTER THREE

The Problems of Supply

The situation of the Army in respect to supply was never anything but precarious, and the Winter of 1778-1779 was no exception. In addition to the usual problems of transportation, dishonesty, and inefficiency, the Army that Winter encountered difficulties brought on by a growing inflation of the currency, Congressional apathy, and dangerous shortages of forage and sometimes food and clothing. There were also additional responsibilities such as equipping an Indian Expedition and feeding the Convention troops captured at Saratoga.

The problems the department under the command of General Nathanael Greene faced were real: the soldiers' very existence depended on their solution, and the proper solution was not always forthcoming.

The greatest task confronting the command at Middlebrook was that of feeding, clothing, and properly equipping the Army. In addition to the seven brigades and additional personnel in camp, there was a brigade at Paramus, and the Artillery Brigade at Pluckemin — both exclusively supplied from Middlebrook. There were sick and wounded to be cared for also. Because the command center of the Continental Army was at Middlebrook, the Quartermaster's Department at camp was responsible as well for the remainder of the Army in the field and for any undertakings that the Army might assume.

Two Supply Magazines

The system of supply devised at Middlebrook was built essentially around two places. In general, most of the food and forage for the use of the Army in camp was deposited at the magazine in Trenton, and the quartermaster's stores, camp equipage, and some clothing were deposited at the magazine at Morristown. The material from both places was shipped to camp as needed. The two magazines were interchangeable, however, and each at one time or another handled practically all that the Army used.

The Trenton magazine was in the charge of Colonel Peter Gordon, quartermaster for the South Jersey area. The Morristown magazine was under the command of Colonel James Abeel, also an Army quartermaster(1).

In a day when transportation facilities were severely limited in comparison to today's modern means, road and weather conditions were prime factors in determining the efficiency with which the Quartermaster Department operated. As early as November 14, 1778, Colonel Abeel wrote that "the badness of the roads" had prevented him from sending material or-

dered to camp(2). The effects of the poor condition of the roads — all unpaved — on the Army was noted by General Wayne on January 16, 1779:

> The state of the publick roads in the vicinity of this camp are known to be extremely bad thro' the neglect of the Supervisers or Officers whose duty it is to keep them in proper repair. It is with the utmost difficulty Provisions and other necessaries can be carried through for the use of the Army(3).

The roads from the magazine at Trenton to camp were especially bad. Towards the end of January they had deteriorated through constant use to the point where if they were not soon repaired, they would become "impassable."(4) Except in inclement weather, the roads from Morristown to Middlebrook were in fair condition. The all important link between Camp Middlebrook and the Artillery Park at Pluckemin was a fine road."(5).

Snows and Freezing

Since the major roads leading to camp were of dirt, the weather seriously affected the transportation of supplies. During the early part of the encampment, the weather was extremely bad. On December 23, there was a "violent snowstorm" accompanied by freezing temperatures(6). To add to the woes of the Continentals, there was a fuel shortage, and the men resorted to the usual practice of stealing and burning fence rails(7). On January 3, it finally rained, melting some of the snow, but on January 5, it snowed again, once more making the roads nearly impassable(8).

Due to the oddities of the weather, it was almost impossible to get supplies through to Middlebrook. In order to relieve the situation the carpenters stationed at Morristown were ordered to build sleds on December 30. By January 9 they were in operation, transporting much-needed supplies to camp(9). The use of sleds worked out so well that on January 23 more were ordered for use at Middlebrook(10). By the end of January, however, the weather had warmed up considerably, and rain had melted most of the snow(11). Except for heavy rains again, in the middle of May, the weather for the remainder of the stay in camp was very good. As Dr. Thacher commented in his Journal:

> We have passed a Winter remarkably mild and moderate; since the 10th of January, we have scarcely had a fall of snow, or a frost, and no severe weather. At the beginning of this month [April] the weather was so mild that vegetation began to appear; the fruit-trees were budded on the 1st, and in full blossom on the 10th. (12).

The transportation of supplies was subject to man-made hazards as well as natural ones. The system of transporting supplies while at Middlebrook was far from efficient. There was a desperate need of waggoners in camp, and it was almost impossible to sign them at the pay offered. When they did join, it

was for one year, and by the time they learned the job, their enlistment was up. (13). James Thompson, the Wagon Master General at Middlebrook, had only 80 waggoners in camp on April 12(14). More would be needed in the coming month in order to break camp. Greene summarized the problem when he notified Washington on April 24:

> I have wrote circular letters to all the deputies in my department on the east side of the Susquehanna, to enlist as many waggoners as they possibly can by the middle of next month; and to have all the public teams forwarded so as to be in camp by that time. I expect our waggoners will fall short as our agents have but a scanty supply of money. (15).

The Army grew so desperate for waggoners that in January they were drawn from the ranks. (16). By April, however, Washington told Greene that because of the "reduced state of the Army," no more men could be taken from the state lines. (17). A number of those originally drafted as waggoners had to be returned to their regiments, for they were under no obligation to take orders from their conductors. Many deserted at this point, without reporting back to their units.(18) With such a shortage of waggoners, delays were inevitable. At one time in May, there were 60 wagons of much needed food supplies at Trenton, all loaded and ready for delivery, but there were no drivers anywhere for these wagons (19). With such problems of supply — natural and otherwise — as the Army faced, a more efficient system would indeed have been a blessing.

No Money to Pay

Greene had mentioned, in speaking of the shortage of waggoners, that he was also short of money. This constituted another problem in properly supplying the Army. The young nation had but little wealth and great expenses. The financial burdens of war had begun to drain a none too sound economy, and by 1778-1779 the effects were beginning to show. The continental paper issued as currency was rapidly growing worthless and inflation was setting in. By January, 1779, wood in the area of camp sold for "30 odd dollars per Cord," and "corn 14 dollars per Bushell [sic]."(20). The soldiers' meager pay remained stationary. Other vital commodities were subject to the same inflationary tendency:

> Wheat is now from 12 to 15 dollars and rye in the same proportion and so great is the dislike of the (continental) money that 7 dollars Hard Money will Purchase a Bushell of Wheat when 15 Continental Dollars are refused (21).

James Thacher paid 600 dollars for a horse not valued at more than 80 dollars "in silver." He lamented the sad state of the money "which we receive for pay." (22). The soldiers in camp complained bitterly, and at least one general officer took up their plea. General Arthur St. Clair, in command of

the Pennsylvania line, wrote to President Reed and the Pennsylvania Council of his men's plight. Prices in camp were outrageous, and he asked Reed to "judge of the rest from this circumstance — a dozen of eggs cannot be purchased for less than two dollars." (23.)

The British were triumphantly gloating over the rebel misfortunes, and wishfully noted that "great discontent is said to prevail in the Army owing to the depreciation of the Currency which renders the pay insufficient to procure the common necessities of life." (24). The British were glad to help the situation along when they could. On January 30, 1779, it was announced that two new emissions of currency were to be issued to the soldiers at Middlebrook in exchange for the currency then in use, because British counterfeiters had flooded the country with the old issue. (25).

The soldiers and officers in camp were often in desperate straits. On the whole, though, they behaved as well as could be expected. General Greene was "surprised that there is not greater complaints than there is. However they [the soldiery] have been rather like dead bodies chained to the living for six months past." (26). The Treasury in Philadelphia was empty; by March 11, the men who had re-enlisted were "very clamerous" about their re-enlistment bounties, which had not been paid. (27).

Others in the service were dissatisfied also. General Greene had received complaints from his deputy quartermaster generals, forage masters, waggoners, and others similarly employed in camp that they were about to leave the Army unless they were better provided. Greene felt that unless enough money was paid to get good honest men, the "indifferent men" that he was forced to hire would cost the public "five times" what the increase in pay would cost. (28). In an attempt to calculate his losses, Greene drew up a balance sheet on which he added up all monies received from the Treasury from September, 1778, to May, 1779. In all, it came to 79 million dollars in Continental currency. He figured the rate of depreciation, and reckoned that in terms of hard money, he had received the equivalent of only five million dollars. (29). If his calculations at Middlebrook were correct, it would almost take a barrel of money to buy a barrel of spirits, as he suggested.

With the money situation what it was, the military chest at Middlebrook was in poor shape. John Pierce, in charge of the chest, reported on January 21, 1779, that he needed money very badly. (30). By April, Washington reported that the treasury at camp was "entirely empty." (31). He lamented the "money does not pass," and discontent among the officers was growing more pronounced. (32). General Greene was constantly besieged with demands for money from his deputies in all quarters. Not a week went by that Greene did not have some messenger on his doorstep in quest of money, and

Congress was slow to act on his claims. (33). Because the credit of the Army suffered, the men themselves felt the bite of hardship.

Greene Goes to Congress

An inefficient Congress added to the woes of the Quartermaster's Department. John Cox, Greene's assistant, was an almost constant representative of the department in attendance in Philadelphia. By February 26, 1779, he had grown bitter:

> I have pressing demands from all quarters. I have not yet answered any of them . . . I have mentioned this to the treasury in strong language both in writing and in daily conversation with the members, but get nothing but fair words and promises which they give me as freely as I would wish. (34).

On April 15, General Greene decided that the department was in such a "critical state" that he had better go to Philadelphia and present his troubles to Congress personally. (35). For some time he had been unhappy in the office of Quartermaster General. He wanted a southern command and he repeatedly reminded Washington of this. (36).

When Greene arrived in Philadelphia towards the end of April, things had not changed insofar as he was concerned. Congress' "stupor is so great, that nothing can alarm their fears, or promote a spirit of industry." He blamed this on "negligence."(37) In an attempt to stir Congress to action, he threatened to resign, saying "unless they change their system, . . . I shall not remain long in the business."(38) The red tape created by Congress, the petty quarrels and jealousies in the Quartermaster Department itself, and the frequent displays of petulance by lesser officials all led to a weakening of efficiency in an already weak department.(39)

An attempt had been made the previous year to strengthen the Quartermaster Department. It had been reorganized and completely overturned in the Spring of 1778. General Greene has been made Quartermaster General, in complete command of that department. He brought with him two assistants, John Cox and Charles Pettit. Greene had worked with both men previously in various business ventures. For the first time since the beginning of the war, the Quartermaster General and his assistants were to work on a commission basis rather than on a salary. The three were to divide one per cent of their total expenditures. This led to some rather dubious practices.

Generally, the duties of the Department included regulating and facilitating the transportation of supplies, and the purchase for the Army of all its material except food. The purchasing of food for the Army was under the direction of Jeremiah Wadsworth, the new Commissary General. He assumed his duties with the understanding that he was sovereign in his own department, just as Greene was in his. This represented a revolutionary change in the management of the Army, for previously, both departments had

been interdependent, and both had been subordinated to the general command of the entire Army.

After the change, the only direct control over the activities of these departments could be exercised by General Washington, and he gave his subordinates carte blanche. General Greene and Jeremiah Wadsworth were old friends and often worked together, sometimes to the detriment of the service. A very close clique had taken over the reins of supply.

Corruption Takes Hold

Thus, another force was busily at work weakening the Quartermaster Department — corruption and profiteering were rife all the way down the line. As early as November 11, 1778, James Abeel at Morristown noted that "there is a very great abuse in the waggon department." (40) Wagons had been loitering four or five days longer on the road than was necessary, and the wagon masters were afraid to say anything about it for fear of reprisal (41). Abeel's suspicions of corruption grew stronger when, on December 18, he received a load of flour that had been opened in transit. Many barrels were only half or two-thirds full and others were unfit for use. The badly needed flour, Abeel felt, had been stolen by the waggoners and sold (42).

Finally, on May 22, 1779, Abeel was able to prove his suspicions. He discovered that many in the waggoners department at Morristown were stealing goods that were supposed to be shipped out for the Indian Expedition and Camp Middlebrook, and selling them to the inhabitants of the area (43). In all, nine persons were found guilty of plundering the wagons and were "made to pay and suffer whatever punishment the law will inflict."(44) These men were civilian employes of the Army and were therefore not subject to military justice.

In the upper levels of administration also, corruption was suspected. Ceasar Rodney, President of Delaware, requested that Congress make an investigation of the purchasing done in the Quartermaster and Commissary Departments as the high prices did not justify the demand for materials (45). Colonel Udney Hay, quartermaster at Fishkill, N.Y., suspected the same thing. In a letter to Greene in January, 1779, he noted that "the extravagant price of every commodity. . . for the Army, arises from the neglect or fraudulent intentions of many of us who are entrusted with Public Monies."(46).

This brought the problem rather close to the top of the Department, and Greene became worried. Indeed, he had reason to worry. His assistant, Charles Pettit, in April reported that there were rumors in Philadelphia among the congressmen (who lost no love for Greene), that "General Greene was too grasping and was making an immense fortune."(47)

Greene's Defense

In reply to the gossip circulating in Philadelphia, Greene wrote a vigorous defense of his actions to James Duane, head of the Treasury Board of Congress. He confessed that "the emoluments arising from the Quarter Master's department. . . is flat-

tering to my fortune, but not less humiliating to my pride." (48). Despite the hurt to his pride, however, he frequently admitted in private correspondence to being involved in some rather shady transactions while at Middlebrook. On April 14, 1779, just when the rumors were circulating, Greene wrote to Jeremiah Wadsworth, the Commissary General:

> You may remember I wrote you . . . that I was desirous that this co-partnership between Mr. [Silas] Dean [earlier Minister to France], John [Cox?], and myself should be kept a secret. I must beg leave to impress this matter upon you again, and to request you to enjoin it upon Mr. Dean. The nearest friend I have in the world shall not know it from me, and it is my wish that no mortal should be acquainted with the persons forming the company except us three . . . he [Mr. Dean's brother] may inadvertantly let it out into the broad world, and then I am persuaded it would work us a public injury. While we continue in the offices which we hold I think it is prudent to appear as little in trade as possible . . . . By keeping the affair a secret I am confident we shall have it more in our power to serve the commercial connection.(49).

As the rumors grew more pronounced, Greene sought an even greater obscurity; two weeks later he wrote to the same agent:

> The plan is very agreeable which is proposed. But in addition to it will it not be best to take upon us a ficticious name? This will draw another shade obscurity over the business and render it impossible to find out the connection. The busy world will be prying into the connection and nature of the business, and more especially as a letter of Mr. Dean's has been lately intercepted in which it is portended great things are discovered and dangerous combinations formed.(50).

Whatever Greene's commercial interests were in this matter, fantastic profits were being made by those supplying the Army. Perhaps his desire "to appear as little in trade as possible" was completely innocent of any taint of personal corruption, but by Greene's own admission, he was making huge amounts of money. At any rate, delays were needlessly incurred as material cheaply bought and dearly sold to the Army was slow in being delivered. Money so necessary to feed the soldiers was diverted to selfish ends and unfair profits. It is little wonder that the soldiers often went hungry at Middlebrook with such corruption on all levels at work.

Great as were the difficulties arising from inadequate transportation facilities, depreciated currency, corruption, and mismanagement, the supply system ground along well enough to keep the Army alive and for the most part fairly well. Food supplies destined for Camp Middlebrook were deposited first at Trenton and forwarded to camp as needed. The volume necessary to feed the Army of 10,000

men was tremendous. In the three-month period from February to April, 1779, alone, 3,920 pounds of wheat were sent to Middlebrook from Trenton, and this was only one item.(51).

States Contributed Cash

Food for the Army at Middlebrook came from a variety of places. Most of the stock of cattle used by the Army came from New England and from Lancaster County, Pa.(52). Salt beef and pork was first treated in Philadelphia, and then sent on to camp through Trenton(53). Food and clothing for the Army were donated by the states to support their respective state divisions. The same held true for money to keep the Army in the field. Both were obtained on a requisition basis, with no means of forcing a state to meet its obligations to the service. Most states attempted to meet their obligations; some did not.

Much of the flour used by the Army originally came from Pennsylvania(54). The situation there with respect to flour, however, was critical, and Royal Flint, of the Quartermaster Department, toyed with the idea of bringing that staple from Maryland(55). Due to the British blockade in Chesapeake Bay and Head of Elk, the attempt was not successful. A more practical plan substituted rice for flour, and this was eventually what was attempted. On January 27, General Greene chartered two Connecticut vessels to carry 1,000 casks of rice from Charlestown, S.C., to camp as soon as possible(56). Unfortunately, the cargo ships could not get through to Charlestown to get the rice as the British were threatening the port at this time(57). To the detriment of the troops, the Quartermaster's Department was far too dependent on Southern food supplies, and they were left wanting when the British fleet blockaded Charlestown and Chesapeake Bay.(58).

Spirits for the men were found closer at hand. James Abeel in Morristown notified General Greene that "by sending barrels to Mr. John Voorheese in Morristown soon as possible you may have to the amount of two barrels of Cyder and by sending Casks to Mr. Coyeman's you may have three barrels more." (59). Things were not altogether gloomy at Middlebrook.

Much food besides liquor came from the Raritan Valley throughout the encampment on the Middlebrook. Somerset County was primarily an agricultural area, and this was an important factor in fixing upon Middlebrook for Winter quarters. Regular foraging expeditions were sent from camp to neighboring farms. In addition, much food was purchased in New Jersey through regular channels. Such staples as wheat and hay, beef, and some vegetables were purchased (or taken) by the Army in New Jersey. It is impossible to determine exactly what provisions did come from within the state, but New Jersey certainly must have supplied in the neighborhood of 25 to 35 per cent of the Army's needs while it was at Middlebrook.

The daily ration for each soldier per day at Middlebrook consisted of 25 ounces of beef or 18 ounces of pork, 16 ounces of bread or flour, and one gill of

spirits "occasionally." In addition, there was ordered an adequate supply of soap and candles for each man.(60) Unfortunately, this idyllic allotment (by Revolutionary standards) was not always issued.

Early in the encampment, there seems to have been an adequate supply of flour on hand, and some quantity of it was even issued to the militia in the area.(61). By the middle of January, however, Lord Stirling noted that "the troops have had no flour issued to them for near a month past, nor any bread except what is made of musty oatmeal and rice which is very short."(62). Since the quartermasters felt they had a surplus earlier, the shortage must have been an unexpected one due either to the blockade, or more probably, transportation and "purchasing" delays.

By February 13, the shortage of flour had become critical. Jeremiah Wadsworth, at Middlebrook for a time, lamented that "we have only four days flour in camp, for heaven's sake don't let us be constantly with wanting flour."(63) There is an irony in this plaintive tone, as Wadsworth was suspected of being one of the cabal conspiring to profit from just such a shortage. At this time, also, the stock of salt and fresh beef and pork on hand was down to five days' supply, and "the posts at Elizabethtown and Pyramus [sic] are calling out hunger."[64].

Always 'the Army Way'

In the usual Army manner, all the beef came to camp at once. By the middle of February, there was a surplus of cattle in camp, and more civilian help was needed(65). From this time, there was no shortage of meat in camp and all the requirements were filled.(66).

The officers had reason to complain of their food allotment, even with plenty of meat on hand. They had recently been restricted to one ration a day and were grumbling. General St. Clair wrote on March 5, 1779:

> I believe we shall have very few officers indeed left by the opening of the campaign . . . . The effect of that resolve of Congress that restrains them to one ration . . . bears very hard upon them. . . . I wish that I was certain many of ours of the Pennsylvania line, in this time of scarcity, were not starving.(67).

Up to the time of the Congressional resolve, officers were issued more than one ration, the number being determined by rank. Since they had to pay for their other necessities, they bartered their extra rations for these, thus supplementing their fast-depreciating income. This was especially true of the Pennsylvania troops at Middlebrook, for their state was one of those delinquent in taking care of its officers.

Further food rations were lost because "the daily issues of Provisions exceed, considerably, the total number of the Troops in this Camp." An inquiry was ordered on April 21, 1779, to find out "the number of rations issued to the women in camp."(68). After this date, the issuance of food was more closely watched.

Due to the critical shortage of forage, poor transportation methods, and unwise administration, much of the meat in camp was lost through spoilage. Because most of the cattle was improperly foraged before reaching camp, some had to be condemned for being too lean(69). General Washington expressed grave concern over this waste. Early in the encampment he ordered an enlarged slaughterhouse to be built, for cattle coming in to camp were so lean as to hardly be alive. Washington hoped that cattle would be fattened considerably before slaughtering, but it was not to be. On February 14, the forage situation had grown so desperate that the Commander remarked that the cattle in camp were given "a slight foddering once every two days," and rather than gaining weight in camp, they were losing it(70).

As Spring approached and the weather grew warmer, a good deal of the salted beef in camp spoiled. On April 29, rancid beef was inadvertently issued to the men in camp causing some sickness(71). On the whole, there seem to have been enough provisions to feed the Army properly, but poor transportation and inadequate safeguards caused the men at Middlebrook to go hungry. The suffering on this score once again could not be compared to the misery at Valley Forge, and if it is possible to compare miseries on a relative scale, then Camp Middlebrook was indeed a successful cantonment.

It has been mentioned in passing that the situation with respect to forage for the Army was critical. It proved to be a major obstacle in attempting to administer the supply of the Army successfully. The problem created by an impending lack of forage was recognized as early as October, 1778, but its magnitude as sources of supply disappeared could not then be guessed.

By December 28, 1778, the scarcity of this commodity had grown so great that Lord Stirling, in command of the camp during Washington's absence in Philadelphia, ordered that the quartermasters "impress forage from farmers around us."(72) He had noted that Monmouth, Burlington, and Gloucester Counties grew a good deal of Indian corn and would probably be able to spare some for the use of the Army. As the usual sources of forage grew scarcer, Stirling, and later Washington, turned more and more to the inhabitants of New Jersey for relief. While the forage in Jersey held out, there was some improvement.

On December 29, Stirling visited Monmouth County, and soon he could report to Washington that "forage is coming in so plenty that we soon shall be able to stop the impressing of it." He added parenthetically: "I shall be glad to get rid of the numerous complaints I have every day from the Farmers." (73)

Complaints From Farmers

But with the great needs of the Army, New Jersey's supply of forage was exhausted as Winter matured. The farmers' complaints grew louder, the State Legislature grew more balky about fixing the prices the farmers could charge the

Army, and the forage coming into camp diminished rapidly. One quartermaster noted that "indeed its of vehy little consequence wether [sic] it [the price] be fixed or not for the little [forage] now in the state."(74)

More and more, Clement Biddle, the Forage Master General, had to depend on outside sources of supply, which were none too dependable. On May 27, he noted that New Jersey had "afforded considerable quantities of hay for this camp, Pluckemin, etc., but for near four months past, our supplies of grain. . . have been drawn from Virginia, Maryland, and the Delaware States by way of Trenton." (75) To make matters worse, the British blockade all but cut off this expected supply. As camp was about to break, Biddle planned to obtain more forage from Jersey through the new crop. Instead of the farmers doing militia duty, Biddle claimed, it would "be of great service to leave the Inhabitants of. . . Essex and Middlesex Counties at their farms" to cut hay. He estimated that this would produce 1,000 tons of hay for the Army(76).

This pressing need of forage had a profound effect on the life in camp. As early as December 22, all public horses that could possibly be spared were sent away from camp. Only those that were absolutely necessary were kept, and General Washington was very specific on this point.(77) A week later, about the time that Stirling started impressing forage in New Jersey, the situation had grown so desperate that even officers entitled to keep horses were "requested" to send them away. The Quartermaster Department bore the expense of transporting them (78).

The public stable in camp grew very particular now about whose horses it fed. Up to this time, officers who kept their own private horses in camp for their own convenience had them fed at public expense. On January 20, the Board of War ordered this practice to be stopped, and thereafter, only those horses belonging to the Army were to draw fodder (79).

Many of the horses sent away from Middlebrook were destined for Wilmington. There they were kept by farmers in the area who were paid by the Government. Soon, there was a lack of forage in that region also. (80). By the middle of February, as the sources of forage dwindled, Biddle grew panicky:

> Indeed I have such unfavourable Reports from every other quarter that unless you send a quantity of grain from the Delaware region . . . to hold us until Harvest, we shall hardly be able to keep our Horses alive in the Camp, or be ready to take the Field in the Spring.(81)

Biddle even tried unsuccessfully to send two "vessels with corn" through the British blockade at the Head of Elk, just below Wilmington, Delaware (82).

By May, General Washington prohibited the use of wagon horses for riding by the officers. All requests for horses now had

to be filed through the Quartermaster General (83).

In addition to the great inconvenience caused in camp, and the loss of valuable horses, the shortage of forage caused delay in shipping. A typical example was recorded by James Abeel:

> Several waggons and pieces of artillery are now in this town [Morristown]. I have not had a pound of hay or anything else to feed their horses which are already so reduced that they can scarcely go. You cannot imagine how the service suffers at this place for want of forage (84).

As May approached, transportation was almost at a standstill. Troop movements, supplies for General Sullivan's Indian Expedition, and preparations for the coming campaign were all suspended (85). By May 10, the difficulties were compounded for a short time as newly-purchased horses were sent to Middlebrook in the expectation that camp would soon break and the horses would be needed to transport the Army(86).

The Forage Master was "barely able to . . . keep those already purchased alive."(87). To complicate matters further, on May 14, Samuel Fleming, the Forage Master in camp, was tried for "neglect of duty [and] . . . disobedience of orders in positively refusing to look out for any more forage, by which neglect and disobedience the horses are rendered unfit for service." He was dismissed from the Army(88).

Many Horses Die

As horses began coming into camp, Biddle applied to the neighboring Justices to issue warrants authorizing the forced renting of pasturage to the Army by the inhabitants of Somerset County. However, the Justices balked and would issue no such warrants, and so the renting of pasturage by the Army remained a purely voluntary proposition.

Unfortunately, Biddle was not successful in renting sufficient pasturage, and so many horses died(89). It is evident that the great disruption of supply and the slowdown of transportation caused by the shortage hurt the Army immeasurably, especially as the time to break camp approached. But the Continentals were a stolid lot and for the most part accepted their fate.

Most of the camp equipage for the Army was forwarded to Middlebrook and elsewhere from the magazine at Morristown under the command of Colonel Abeel. Camp equipage included such things as tents, tools, utensils, and materials of a similar nature. During the Winter of 1778-1779, Morristown became the center for the repairing of old tents and the making of new ones. Nothing was wasted there; tents no longer fit for service were made into wagon covers, forage bags, knapsacks, and even canteens (90). Originally, a part of the equipment necessary to the manufacture of tents came from Baltimore.

Many of the tools and accessories, for example barrels, used by the Army, were shipped to Morristown from the old encampment at Valley Forge (91).

Additional tents for the Army to the number of 1,000 were ordered and made in Boston. Only 300 in all were ever received from that place, however (92). Due to a shortage of "duckcloth" or canvas with which to make tents, there was a chronic shortage of them at Middlebrook when they were most needed, before the huts were built.(93)

There was a shortage as well of other basic equipage at Middlebrook. There were only 2,851 knapsacks in camp, or a little more than one for every three enlisted men. There were only 858 canteens, or one for about every 10 men. Besides, there was a shortage of tools among the men in camp. There were only 825 axes in camp, or one for every 10 men. Many of these were inferior and easily broken. There were shortages also of shovels, spades and saws.(94).

As Spring approached, Greene grew worried over the increasing shortage of equipment. A week before camp broke, he reckoned that he would fall far short of his needs to take the field. He would need at least 6,277 knapsacks, 7,795 canteens, 1,906 common tents, 632 camp kettles, and 334 officers' portmanteaus. The drastic shortage of such equipment would severely hamper the movements of the Army during the ensuing campaign (95).

Besides making good the shortages at Middlebrook, Abeel supplied many other cantonments that Winter as well. Equipage destined for Morristown came from such places as Albany, N. Y., and Lancaster, Easton, and Reading, Pa. After the weather turned cold and snow has fallen, much of this material was sent at least part way by sled (96).

It is interesting to note that some of the camp equipage for use at Middlebrook was manufactured not far away, in Boonton New Jersey. Samuel Ogden, a local manufacturer in Boonton, negotiated to supply the Army with various equipment, for example, curry combs for the horses, stove pipes, and camp kettles in great quanity. He evidently got the contract because his brother, Abraham Ogden, was a close friend of James Abeel, and Abeel used his influence with General Greene to get the contract for Ogden(97). Through his efforts in supplying Middlebrook and adequately fulfilling his obligations, he received more Army business in the course of the Revolutionary War.

The Ordnance Department at Middlebrook was in a poor state throughout the encampment. In April, Washington attempted to maintain a close check on the magazines at Middlebrook and ordered a "General Return of Ordnance and Military Stores." He noted at this time a "great deficiency" in small arms, powder, and lead (98). The Ordnance Department at this time was under the command of General Knox, at Pluckemin. When Knox applied to the Board of War for more arms and ammunition, he found that they too were short of supplies, and there was a fear that "ammunition will not be ready" for the coming campaign (99).

Shortage of Cannon

On May 19 a "conductor of military stores" was ordered ap-

pointed by each brigade at Middlebrook to better control the arms on hand (100). There was a pressing shortage of cannon in the Army also, and Washington feared for the Highlands of New York which were inadequately protected.(101). With all the troubles this Continental Army had, it is a wonder that Washington was able to keep an Army in the field at all.

Except for isolated instances, the Army was as well clothed during their stay at Middlebrook as it would ever be. Uniforms had just arrived from France and were distributed in camp. There were not nearly enough to go around, but the situation was eased for the coming Winter.(102). Washington, in one of his few optimistic remarks, noted that "the greatest care should also be taken that the men preserve. . . neatness in their dress, which they now happily have more in their power than heretofore."(103).

But there was still no uniformity in the dress of the men. The state lines at camp drew lots for uniform colors, but the shipment from France afforded little semblance of uniformity. The Maryland Division by lot was assigned blue uniforms, the Virginia, Delaware, and Pennsylvania troops drew brown. But even among these, the facings of the coats were of different designs and color. If we were able to review the Continental Army on parade, the most common attire would have remained the brown hunting shirt and sandals, and any hat that was available, comfortable, and warm. The uniforms of the Army remained a catch-as-catch-can affair despite the shipments from France.

Though the men in the ranks were better clothed than formerly, it was only a relative improvement, and there were still some serious shortages. This is borne out by the fact that thread was issued to the men in April so "that their. . . clothes are repaired without loss of time."(104). The officers especially, because they had to purchase their own uniforms, were often in serious want. A report on the clothing situation in the Delaware regiment in May is indicative:

> I find the officers in Extream [sic] want of Coats, stockings and shoes, and even shirts, Jackets and Breeches, and without which, they must sink into contempt with the other officers of the Army; as their pay cannot purchase them . . . . I find that the regiment hath suffered for want of Blankets.(105).

Even Washington's own Life Guard suffered from want of clothing. Washington wrote its commander that "t h e r e are neither stockings nor shirts in store and what shoes we have on hand are for a particular occasion [the I n d i a n Expedition]." (106)

More than any other in camp the officers of the Pennsylvania line suffered the most from want of clothing. Indeed, their situation in respect to clothing was so serious that Washington addressed the Board of War:

> Their condition. . .is really distressing, and if effectual means are not adopted to re-

> lieve them, necessity must oblige them to quit the service.(107)

The State of Pennsylvania undertook to outfit its officers, but speculators blocked the way. "Sufficient Quantity of Cloths [sic] . . . are not to be had in this City [Philadelphia]; the few there are, in the hand of retailers at very high prices."(108).

Shoes for the Army were made by the soldiers themselves at a factory in Newark. Lieutenant Thomas Hugo, of the Maryland line, was in charge of the factory, and it was completely manned by soldiers of that line from Middlebrook (109). The importance of the factory in Newark to the soldiers at Middlebrook was indicated when an officer from the Delaware regiment noted that the factory had disbanded. He remarked that 'this will make the purchasing of shoes very difficult."(110).

And there was a great need of shoes as well as other clothing. The Army had undertaken to supply the Indian Expedition [which was planned at Middlebrook] and also the feeding and care of the Saratoga Convention troops in their march to prison camp in Albemarle, Va. Besides all of these, the sick had to be taken care of.

Army Hospitals

They required constant attention and a great deal of valuable supplies. The most important hospital serving Camp Middlebrook was located in New Brunswick, under the command of Colonel Abraham Beauford of the 11th Virginia Regiment. The majority of the regimental sick were transported to New Brunswick and cared for So far as can be determined, they were ' properly supplied with the usual stores."(111)

Lieutenant Colonel Charles Dabney was the Superintendent of Hospitals in New Jersey. On May 18, he was replaced by Major Stevenson. Under these men a satisfactory system was at last inaugurated for the care of the sick. The surgeons of the Army were requested to "make a return of their Mates, Medicines and Instruments to the Director General" periodically (112). Every Monday the Surgeons were required to report their returns of the sick to the Director at New Brunswick (113). No sick were to be sent from Middlebrook without a certificate authorized by the Director General. Sometime in February, a course of lectures was begun "on anatomy and the operations of Surgery." All regimental Surgeons were required to attend (114).

An enlisted man who became ill or wounded was treated at the expense of the Army, but an officer had to pay his own way. Lieutenant McKenna of the Delaware Regiment learned of this practice the hard way. He had been wounded in action and was recuperating at New Brunswick. After leaving the hospital and rejoining his regiment at Middlebrook in March, he sent a bill to his regimental colonel to forward to the state of Delaware. He complained:

> The reasons for charging subsistence [on his bill to the state] was occasioned by Dr. Shippen's prohibiting officers to draw either provisions, or other Hospital

> Stores, and consequently my Boy and myself, must perish, or pay at the rates specified.(115).

Thus, even an officer wounded in the line of duty had to pay for his own care.

'Sometime in April, due to an epidemic, probably of influenza, the number of sick in camp had drastically increased. As a result, an emergency hospital was put into operation at nearby Somerset Court House. The unfortunate circumstances of its beginning had led to bitterness in the Army and among the inhabitants. However, 40 or 50 sick and neglected soldiers were put into quarantine there and given the care they needed. Many were still there when camp broke in June, and at this time they were transported from the hospital at Somerset to the more comfortable barracks at Pluckemin, where they were treated until they were able to rejoin their regiments (116).

Not so fortunate in the care they received were the Saratoga Convention troops. In October of 1778 — a year after their capture — the soldiers of General Burgoyne's Army captured at Saratoga started their long trek to a prison camp in Albemarle, Va. It fell to the already overtaxed Quartermaster Department at Middlebrook to supply these troops on their march. While every courtesy was shown to the captured general officers, the British and Hessian soldiers suffered from lack of proper food and care on their march to Albemarle (117). A detachment of these troops under Captain Thomas Bibby visited Middlebrook on January 18, 1779, to discuss their grievances as representatives of the captured Army.

Lord Stirling, in command at the time, treated them courteously, and even sent a captain from the Virginia line in camp to accompany the convention troops to Virginia as his personal representative (118). Despite these amenities, however, little could be done to ease their discomfort. An attempt was made to effect and exchange of prisoners also. William Phillips, a British agent, visited camp early in December and spoke to General Washington, but this effort failed and the British prisoners continued their march (119).

With the multitude of problems facing the Quartermaster Department that Winter, their overtaxed administrative machinery was often stretched to the breaking point, but always managed somehow to survive. On the whole, the troops were inadequately supplied at Middlebrook. On a relative basis, they were far better supplied than they had been either at Morristown or Valley Forge. This is a difficult comparison to make, however, as they nearly starved or froze or both at each camp.

Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the Army suffered less at Middlebrook than they had at earlier encampments. It is tragic that we must thus callously adjudge their misfortunes, but nevertheless, it constitutes the fairest appraisal. The supply system, as has been noted, was rife with corruption and mismanagement, in addition to the Army's other woes. Its record constitutes the saddest and most shameful phase of our great struggle for independence.

CHAPTER FOUR

Relations With the Inhabitants

It was not without a great deal of friction that the Continental Army moved into Somerset County in the Winter of 1778. When almost 10,000 soldiers were quartered upon a community of 10,000 people, there were bound to be "incidents," strained tempers, and a good deal of bitterness both in camp and among the inhabitants.

The tension was heightened by the general scarcity of the necessities of life that prevailed throughout the states. Not only was the soldier in want of food and clothing, but the inhabitants, in the distress and turmoil of armed conflict, were wanting in the basic necessities as well. The remarkable fact was that not only did the Army and the community make the best of the situation in a negative sense, but for the first time in the course of the war a mutual cooperation led to the alleviation of a great many of the problems facing both soldier and resident.

The Army at Middlebrook was not a self-sufficient unit. Indeed, its well-being was dependent upon sustenance afforded by the local citizenry. We have seen how to a great extent the Army depended on local foraging expeditions for its grain. The same dependence upon local cooperation held in respect to wood for hutting and fuel, to a locally organized militia to aid in case of attack, and to other elements necessary to the welfare of the Army.

On the whole, these needs were supplied but not always, of course, without irritation and grumbling. In return the Army afforded much-needed protection to a devastated New Jersey countryside. To some extent the soldiers — and to a greater degree the officers — created a market from which many inhabitants profited, often illegally. They rented out their houses to the officers for quarters, other buildings housed private soldiers, and lesser structures were used for various headquarters for additional units or even storehouses.

Many rented their pastures to the Army, and others were employed by the Continentals in various capacities. Some, though a minority, indulged in profiteering enterprises involving the soldiery, for example, smuggling liquor to the soldiers at outrageous prices.

Disharmony Created

The comparatively few on both sides, who through selfish interests disturbed the peace for the sake of their own profit, did much to spoil what was at best the unstable harmony that prevailed between citizen and soldier at Middlebrook. At times the uneasy truce maintained by a strict and new-found discipline within the Army gave

way to bitter denunciations, petty robberies, and spiteful retaliations. These evidences of lack of co-operation have come down to us, but accompanied also by evidence of a different sort that point to a submergence of personal interest in the cause of freedom. There were many examples of this also at Middlebrook.

The officers who had been with the Army at previous encampments had learned to expect complaints from the inhabitants of nearby areas about thefts and depredations on the part of the soldiers. Only two weeks after arriving at Middlebrook, it was necessary to warn that "the strictest regularity and decency" be observed to the people of the country(1). The orders continued: "Officers are desired to use their utmost endeavours to detect and bring to punishment Maurauders of every kind." After only two weeks, soldiers had been at work in the country.

In order to reduce the friction, Washington warned the inhabitants "not to hunt or fire in the neighborhood of the Camp."(2). Despite these precautions, however, General Stirling grumbled about the "frequent complaints . . . of the wanton destruction . . .of the Farmers' inclosures [sic]."(3).

The chief offenders in this instance were the soldiers of the Pennsylvania line quartered across the Raritan near Millstone. The majority of complaints concerning the burning of fences for firewood were coming from this area. The complaints became so numerous by the middle of January that it was necessary for General Wayne, in command of the line, to warn that "every possible method" would be employed to stop the destruction(4). He added that "the other divisions have carefully preserved the fences in their vicinity."(5) In fairness to the soldiers it should be noted that the wood being burned was used for firewood; the Pennsylvanians had no suitable shelter at this time to protect themselves against a severe cold spell.

GI's Trample Grain

The inhabitants objected also to the carelessness of the soldiers in crossing their wheat and rye fields and trampling the crop. At first, the officers warned the inhabitants to protect their crops; finally, though, it became necessary to post a guard of four men each to a wheatfield in the vicinity of camp(6). The chief offenders in this instance were the men of the Maryland line. Upon Washington's return from Philadelphia in February, his first orders to the soldiery asked the men to respect "the property of the Farmers in the vicinity of camp."(7).

Another sore point with the inhabitants was their frequent complaint that the camp was filthy. Again, because the Marylanders were closest to town, they bore the brunt of the complaints, and more than once General Smallwood ordered that the Maryland camp be kept clean(8).

There were numerous complaints also about cutting down trees belonging to the inhabitants, again for firewood. At least one resident, Peter Van Burgh Livingston, lodged a com-

plaint with the civil authorities respecting this misdemeanor (9). Unfortunately for the inhabitants, the officers and men of the Army would not submit to a civil court of justice, and little could be done about punishing the men except by court martial. This gave but little satisfaction to the residents who did not recover their property by this method. Governor William Livingston's objections to this treatment were of but little avail in this instance(10).

There were many times throughout the Winter and Spring when high-ranking officers of the Army complained about or mistreated the civilians in one way or another. This was indicative of the attitude of the Army as a whole toward the local populace, for the men of the Army could be counted upon to follow the example set by their officers; it was frequently not a good example to follow.

When General Greene arrived at Middlebrook, he formed a favorable impression of the inhabitants of the area. He wrote to General Wayne:

> One thing is to be said in favour of the inhabitants of this part of the country, they are generally good Whigs and deserve all the indulgence that can be given them, beside which it will be for our interest to keep them as good-natured as possible for our own case and convenience.(11)

As time passed, however, Greene's opinion slowly but radically changed. It was General Greene who was beset by the complaints of the residents, as they expected him to put a stop to the foraging expeditions and impressment of much-needed food for the Army. By April 14, Greene was bitter in his denunciation of the same people who four months before he had warned against antagonizing. He noted that "the pettifoging Lawyers, like frogs in the Spring, begin to peep in great plenty." He added, picturesquely, that these were as destructive to the peace of the state as were the "locusts to the growth of the herbage in Egypt"(12). In addition, the number of Justices of the Peace who best him in behalf of their towns appeared to Greene to be "as formidable in numbers as a Roman legion." He described them as "men [who] to show their learning and improve their genius, swarm about us like birds of prey seeking whom they may devour."(13)

'Mad Anthony' Gets Mad

Another incident creating bad feeling between the Army and the inhabitants involved General Wayne and Abraham Van Nest, a local Justice of the Peace Van Nest had a warrant for the arrest of two soldiers of the Pennsylvania line who had allegedly committed a crime against the inhabitants. Early in March, he called upon "Mad Anthony" very late one night demanding the soldiers' arrest. Unfortunately, he woke Wayne from his sleep, and greatly angered, Wayne called Van Nest a "damned rascal," put him under guard, and had him "escorted" to his home(14). This did not make Wayne or his troops any more popular with the townspeople and served only to increase the growing tension.

The previous month a somewhat similar incident occurred. Colonel Thomas Craig was accused of "beating and otherwise ill-treating Caleb Brokaw, an inhabitant of this State [of New Jersey]."(15) In April, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Adams was served a writ for impressing forage illegally and to the detriment of the local people. (16).

These were but examples of many similar incidents of impressment of supplies. The public was easily antagonized and greatly outraged by such occurrences, and often the handling of the incidents by the officers made the situation worse instead of better.

A good indication of the mutual feelings between soldier and civilian at the close of the Middlebrook encampment is found in a passage left to us by a soldier relating his experience with a local resident. Sergeant Ramsey was sent by the Quartermaster Department to escort horses out of the state. On his errand, he spent a night at the Inn of the Bogarts on the Lamington River, not far from the Clothier's Office near Pluckemin. He and another soldier named Church had an argument with the landlord, Mr. Bogart, and his son-in-law, Colonel Vroom of the New Jersey Militia, over the adequacy of the civil and military laws under which the civilian-soldier relationship was managed.

Bogart aroused Ramsey's temper by calling military law "arbitrary." His son-in-law, Colonel Vroom, added that "officers in general were Rogues, that they took from the publick much more than was their due," and were in short, "Damned Rascals." Ramsey, by this time thoroughly provoked, retorted "by anything I could perceive in [Colonel Vroom], Vroom would take as much as any of them." (17) Very rarely did such invective come out in the open, but obviously many were thinking ing the same thoughts.

Aside from the natural enmity that developed between the soldiers and civilians, there were other causes of friction as well. The entire problem of the Army's living off the land was magnified by the great shortages among the civilian population. According to a British spy living near Camp Middlebrook, "the inhabitants feel the effects of the war in a general want of provisions of all kinds. . . The depreciation of Paper Dollars is a blessed thing; it does the work as well as a drubbing would, but a little of both would be most effectual" (18). Thus, the residents of Somerset and neighboring counties did not willingly part with the supplies they so badly needed themselves. Also, when Continental foragers came to call, they often made little distinction between necessities and surplus in their efforts to fill their quotas.

A British Spy Reports

By February 14, 1779, another British spy, whose name remains unknown, found enough dissatisfaction among the inhabitants to report:

> Governor Livingston quarrels with all the military in Jersey. . . They must know the game is up, that the people would no longer be abused, robbed, deprived of every enjoyment of life to

serve the ends of a few. . . The Certain accounts of our success in Georgia and the West Indies which was so unlookt for by the Rebels in general, (who had been long taught by their leaders to believe that England fully intended to give up the matter and even evacuate New York), together with their internal feuds, wants and apprehension of taxes. . . from all accounts from all parts raised universal clamour and discontent against men and measures. (19).

About this time relations with the residents of the Raritan Valley had reached their lowest point. There was some truth in the reports of the squabbles of military and civilian administration, including disputes between Governor Livingston and the Army. Certainly reports of shortages and inflation were well founded. Furthermore, the military affairs of the Americans had taken a turn for the worse in the South at this time, discouraging the Army and disillusioning an already much-disillusioned citizenry.

Although the Army was frequently at fault in antagonizing the civilians, in many ways the citizens of neighboring communities took advantage of the Army. When the Army tried to buy forage instead of requisitioning it, the farmers generally asked exorbitant prices (20).

There was a constant illicit trade being carried on between New Jersey and New York, mainly by women who easily received passports on the pretense of visiting captured relatives. When these women were captured and searched by the Continentals, and their goods confiscated, an unpleasant situation resulted. Bad feeling was created throughout nearby communities over this seemingly tyrannical abuse of power by the Army. Washington was much vexed by this problem (21).

Unscrupulous peddlers in the vicinity of Camp Middlebrook took advantage of the shortage in camp by smuggling illegal liquor to the soldiers. These men made a small fortune on this one item alone. Washington lodged the following complaint with Governor Livingston on this subject:

> I am every now and then embarrassed by disputes between the Officers and Inhabitants, which generally originate from the latter coming into Camp with liquor, selling it to the soldiers, and, as the officers alledge, taking Clothing Provision or Accoutrements in pay. . . The Officers undertake to punish those suspected of such practices, sometimes with reason and probably sometimes without foundation. (22).

In order to remedy the situation, Washington desired that a law be passed specifically forbidding the practice of selling illegal liquor. General Wayne was sent as an emissary to the New Jersey Legislature to propose such a law(23). The law was never enacted.

There were many inhabitants of New Jersey who worked for the Army as civilian employees. Often, it was found that some of these either stole from the ser-

vice or received the stolen goods. Colonel Abeel in Morristown wrote General Greene that he had "searched many houses and found Cloaths, Tents new and old, axes, horse shoes, picks, shovels. . . and many other articles" stolen from his quartermaster depot (24).

Perhaps the most stinging blow to the relationship between military and civilian was the lack of cooperation on the part of many citizens. About the middle of May, a sudden epidemic, probably of influenza, broke out in camp. "Three large barns or as many as will hold 150 patients" were needed, in the vicinity of Somerset Court House (25). The three barns most suitable to the emergency needs of the Army belonged to "Messrs. Duryea and Van Doran," and Ernestus Harlingen, the Justice of the Peace for Somerset Court House. The three barns were not then in use, and no difficulty was anticipated in confiscating them for the Army.

Harlingen Protests

However, when the Army made formal application for the use of the barns on May 10, they found that they had to apply to Mr. Harlingen, the owner of one of the barns. Harlingen, in answering the application, threatened to imprison the first who shall "prostitute a Barn to the use of sick soldiers."(26) The doctor in charge, Dr. Binney, reported back to General Greene that "we must either return some of our sick to camp, or let them lye [sic] in the open fields."(27) Finally, on May 19, the Army in desperation took the barns by force and ended the matter (28).

Though there were such indidents between civilian and soldier, these were not the whole story. As Spring approached, things generally took a turn for the better. Forage and food became easier to come by. Of primary importance, France had materially increased her aid and promised still more. The same spy who on February 14 could report disaster for the American cause, reported on May 4: "It is absolutely necessary to inform them [the British] that unless proper caution is made on their part, the leaders of the Rebellion that at present hold the reins, will acquire double strength." (29).

The reason for this apparent turnabout was the newly reinvigorated relations between the United States and France growing out of diplomatic talks at Camp Middlebrook in April. The new aura of hope reached the inhabitants as well as the Army in New Jersey, and the civilian-military relationship was re-established on a firmer footing.

The more favorable side of the relationship was built upon the sympathies and the often overlooked feeling of self-sacrifice of the majority of the civilians in the Raritan Valley. Their qualities of patriotism and loyalty are often overlooked because there are no "incidents" to illustrate them. But the majority of people, while not joyously anticipating the arrival of the Army, accepted it, and at least looked upon it as a necessary burden. Abraham Lott, a civilian living in Morristown, and one who had undergone the experience of having the Army near by, wrote to his nephew:

> I pity your uncle. . . and his Raritan Neighbours: They will know what I have for full two years experienced, what discomforts arise from having the army among and near them. But there is no help for it, they must be in quarters somewhere among their friends(30).

And, as Lott expressed it, "there is no help for it," and the people quietly accepted it.

The Army that came to Middlebrook was a small one and it was extremely short-handed. In order to maintain the camp, at least 50 civilians from the surrounding countryside were employed by the Army (31). Their jobs varied from carting hay to slaughtering cattle. Many had positions of responsibility, such as Jacob Weiss, who was in charge of the quartermaster stores, and John Mehelm, who was the Commissary of Hides. One civilian, Cornelius Voorheis, was employed by the Army to discharge debts contracted by the Service in Somerset County. He also purchased necessities for Washington and his family and the other general officers (32).

Many other local farmers received money from the Army for renting out their pastures for the use of the Army's horses; in all, 58 civilian farmers were paid rental for their pastures.(33). Hundreds of pounds were paid in damages to at least 19 local civilians who claimed that the Army had destroyed some of their property. These were paid immediately upon verification of their claims. They did not have to wait till the end of the war or institute legal action in order to gain payment(34).

All in all, the Army was quite humane in its dealings with the residents of Somerset County, and many benefitted materially from the Army's stay at Middlebrook. This did much to ease the tension between the soldiers and inhabitants and made many friends for the cause.

The Army served a far more important function to the New Jersey area insofar as the civilian population was concerned. The brigades stationed throughout the state served as protectors of a much-devastated countryside and this too aided in improving the situation. As early as December 16, 1778, Washington notified Governor Livingston that "the safety of its [New Jersey's] inhabitants had been a particular consideration"(35).

By the time June rolled around, the situation had so improved that the inhabitants were quite willing to lend the Army a hand in breaking camp. Nonmobile material was left in the care of neighboring farmers who stored boards, heavy equipment, and tools in their barns(36).

They did this without compensation. In order to insure the good will of the people after the Army left, Colonel Sidney Berry was left behind with instructions to honor all certificates held by the inhabitants in the neighborhood of the camp for material requisitioned by the Army(37). Thus, we know that everything taken officially by the Army was paid for.

In the beginning of June, as General Washington was pre-

paring to leave Middlebrook and begin another campaign, he received a letter from the minister and parishioners of the Dutch Reformed Church in Raritan. In it they expressed their belief in the cause for which the Continentals were fighting, their faith in Washington the general, and most importantly, their respect and admiration of the Army which had encamped on the Middlebrook (38).

The letter was pleasing to Washington and indicated that at least one nearby community understood the problems of the Army and made the best of what could have easily been an intolerable situation.

Washington, in answering the letter, said:

> In quartering any Army, and in supplying its wants, distress and inconvenience will often occur to the citizen. I feel myself happy in a consciousness that these have been strictly limited by necessity, and in your opinion of my attention to the rights of my fellow citizens. I thank you sincerely for the sense you entertain of the conduct of the Army. (39).

CHAPTER FIVE

Life at Middlebrook

Winter for the Continental Army meant a time of peace, a few months when they would not have to march and to fight. The cold weather brought with it an enforced idleness for both sides. For the American Army, at least, Winter also brought a period of suffering from cold and from lack of proper food and clothing. The Army ran down during the period between campaigns.

Enlistment terms expired, and desertions increased as the men were commonly subject to hardship. The Winter of 1778-1779 at Middlebrook was no exception. Only the hard veteran core of the Army would endure the privation and inactivity common in an Army camp, grumbling and threatening perhaps, but nevertheless sticking out the Winter.

What did the men do at Middlebrook during their enforced idleness? How did they react to hardship? What recreations took up their leisure hours? What did their discipline consist of? As is usual, the officers were able to make much the better of the situation. There were parties, celebrations, and a busy social season at Middlebrook to fill their off-hours.

The enlisted men were given to plainer amusements. Life at Middlebrook was kept interesting. Also, from an examination of the daily routine much can be discovered. What the soldiers thought, how they reacted to the pressures of more than three years of fighting, and their capacity to go on can all be determined from such a study. Even those who were not "Summer soldiers" or "sunshine patriots," had their moments of doubt and they were not shy in expressing them. Finally, many things of significance took place at Middlebrook that Winter that have gone unnoticed. Some were apparently routine, all in the soldiers' way of life. But others, such as the visit of the French Minister, were more colorful and noteworthy. All — from the seemingly routine building of the huts to the drilling and pageantry of the soldiers' exercises under Baron Steuben — had a profound effect on the efficiency of the Army and hence on the outcome of the War.

The troops assigned to Middlebrook began arriving early in December and continued to straggle in throughout the month. The last to arrive were the Pennsylvanians. The first concern of all the troops was the building of adequate huts. Early indications promised a bitter cold Winter, and Washington was determined to prevent a repetition of Valley Forge. During the early stages, he himself supervised the laying out of the camp. The huts of the

soldiers were formed in straight lines, with those of the officers in front of each row. The huts descended down the line according to rank, the kitchens being placed in the rear of each line. In front of each row was a clearing to be used for a parade ground and roll call for the regiments.(1).

General Washington, using the experience he gained so dearly at Valley Forge, ordered that the men not sink their huts into the damp ground or cover them with earth. They should be "roofed with boards, slabs or large shingles," and each soldier was to build for himself a bunk above the ground with enough room for himself and his musket.(2). Ditches were ordered built on the upper side of every row of huts to carry off the water. The streets between the rows were to be kept free of obstruction as were the regimental parade grounds.(3).

Construction of Huts

Dr. James Thacher, attached to the Virginia Division, left this detailed description of the construction of the huts at Middlebrook:

> Log houses are constructed with the trunks of trees cut into various lengths, according to the size intended, and are firmly connected by notches cut at their extremities in the manner of dovetailing. The vacancies between the logs are filled in with plastering consisting of mud and clay. The roof is formed of similar pieces of timber, and covered with hewn slabs. The chimney, situated at one end of the house, is made of similar but smaller timber, and both the inner and the outer side are covered with clay plaster, to defend the wood against the fire. The door and windows are formed by sawing away part of the logs of a proper size, and move on wooden hinges. In this manner have our soldiers without nails, and almost without tools, except the axe and the saw, provided for their officers and for themselves comfortable and convenient quarters.(4)

The officers' huts (the same size as the soldiers) were occupied by three or four officers; 10 to 12 soldiers were placed in each of the one-roomed huts, their bunks being placed one above the other against the walls. Each berth was filled with straw, and the soldiers were issued one blanket apiece.(5).

The first unit to complete its huts was General Washington's Life Guard. The Guard, camped at Raritan, started building huts on December 9 and, working rapidly with the choicest of material and tools available, finished the job in a week. By December 16, Elijah Fisher could report that "we finished our huts and we left our tents and moved into them."(6)

The last to finish their huts were the Pennsylvanians. They had arrived last in camp and suffered the most.

General Wayne reported back to the Pennsylvania Council that "the Manuvers of the enemy up the North River have put us so far back in Hutting, that all the Pennsylvania Line are at this

inclement season [December 28] exposed to wind and weather in their old tents." More than one-third of them were "quite destitute of blankets" and without hats.(7). The officers were in a situation "more intolerable than the soldiers," being "so naked, as not to be fit to appear on parade."(8). Indeed, Wayne was so alarmed at the condition of his officers that he warned the Council that "a very great proportion of them [officers] . . . must be permitted to go home and leave their men unofficered . . . never to return to this Army again."(9).

It is little wonder that the Pennsylvanians, so exposed to the "very severe storm from Christmas to New Years," burnt fence rails to keep their little fires going. More than fifty of the soldiers suffered frostbite.(10).

According to Dr. Thacher, all the troops, including the Pennsylvanians, had completed their huts by early February.(11). It is certain that the huts were not finished much before the end of January, for General Greene noted on January 27 that "the men have been too much fatigued with hutting to turn out in any great numbers for [the repair of] the roads." (12). Despite the severe cold, the Army — excepting the Pennsylvanians — was in "great health and good spirits," as of December 28, according to General Stirling. For the Maryland and Virginia troops, "the hutting had gone as well as the weather would admit of."(13).

Three times — at the end of January, on February 16, and April 1 — the officers had to be reminded to rejoin their men in camp and give up their more elaborate and comfortable quarters outside of camp.(14). At the end of January, even General Wayne could report to Washington that "our city is completely finished." Speaking of the entire Middlebrook encampment, Wayne continued:

> Its [the camp's] regularity is equal to any on the continent. Its internal police is at least as regular as that of Philadelphia. I can assure your excellency that we are much improved in city building. . . We are become as healthy and regular an Army as ever made a Winters campaign. (15).

Unfortunately, this regularity and orderliness in camp did not continue past March. On April 1, new recruits and soldiers who had been on furlough began pouring into Middlebrook. Without adequate shelter, they started building huts wherever timber was available. In the Maryland Division, General Smallwood ordered that huts

> built and building in the front and on the flanks of the incampment **[sic]**, together with the disorder those hutts generally produce oblige him to order . . . all such hutts of their respective brigades as may be in front, rear, or any distance from the right or left of the encampment, pulled down.(16).

The unfortunate soldiers who had already completed these huts were thus forced to tear them down and start all over again.

The building of huts was a major occupation during the early Winter, but the soldiers were still left a good deal of leisure time. The long evenings, the dreary, cold, and often empty days left the soldier seeking an outlet for his pent-up energies. General Washington thought that, ideally, the best means of relieving excess energy and providing morale-building strength was through prayer. At Middlebrook he designated certain days as "religious holidays," and a revivalist atmosphere was created by the chaplains in camp.

A typical holiday — the first at Middlebrook — was held during a very trying period. The Army was beset by severe cold on December 30. This day was declared a Continental Thanksgiving Day. Washington asked that the soldiers give thanksgiving and praise for the good that had befallen the people of the states "in the course of the present war." The entire Army was to observe the day, and "the different chaplains will prepare discourses suited to the occasion."(17).

Troops were paraded on the field at Middlebrook, and a religious service and sermon followed, according to Dr. Thacher, to increase morale. According to another correspondent it was a "pleasant" day.(18). The holiday came at a time when the soldiers were certainly in need of a diversion because the unsheltered Army was suffering terribly from the cold. Another such day was May 6, 1779. It was similarly celebrated, and it should be noted that it followed closely a strengthening of ties with France.(19).

The strengthening of the alliance between France and America can to some degree be attributed to a visit to Middlebrook by the French and Spanish ministers at the beginning of May. Preparations for the reception and entertainment of M. Girard, the French Minister to America, and Don Juan Miralles, the Spanish Minister, were in the making long before their arrival.

General Smallwood was asked to choose four of his best battalions from among the Maryland troops to perform for the visitors. These were given over to Baron Steuben who taught them selected maneuvers for the occasion. They were drilled for five days in "artillery and musketry salutes, deploy of the troops, an advance and retreat, a bayonet charge, ending with a parade past the minister."(20).

A great celebration was planned with all the military trimmings. According to General Greene, the general officers at camp were to "ride out" to meet the French Minister, "to welcome him to Camp." Greene was fearful lest the American troops "make but a skimpy appearance; . . . our force is but small and those very ragged." (21). Greene was treated to a pleasant surprise, however. He wrote on May 1, after coming from the review: "We have just come from reviewing a part of the Troops, which made an elegant appearance and the French Ambassador and Don Juan who were present showed a great mark of their approbation."(22). General Washington, too, was

pleased with the showing his troops had made.(23).

The French Minister, his entourage, and Don Juan Miralles had arrived at Middlebrook on May 1. The French Minister was put up at the Wallace House as a guest of General Washington. The others were put up "in the neighborhood of camp." (24) General von Steuben had arrived in camp just a few days prior to the expected visit of the dignitaries to train the honor guard. He had up to this time been in Philadelphia where he had "become very intimate" with M. Girard. According to Steuben's account, the Minister's visit to camp was for the express purpose of seeing his old friend the Baron. Steuben later wrote that Girard

> honored me with a visit in the camp where he came expressly for that purpose. He was received with all the honors of an ambassador. On the day after his arrival, I ordered a maneuver with eight regiments of Infantry.(25).

Obviously, the Baron had embellished his share of importance in the proceedings. Washington had ordered the maneuvers, and Girard's purpose was more than social. Baron von Steuben did play an important part — he was the host at a huge banquet given at his house following the maneuvers of May 1. The Spanish Minister, Don Juan, left an account of it:

> At the end of this function [parading of the troops] and ride, we passed with the other guests to the lodging of Baron De Steuben, inspector general of the army, in a tent erected for that purpose.(26).

But the visit to camp by the diplomats was more than a social call. Important discussions were held. General Greene had reported from Philadelphia on April 22 that rumors were circulating that Great Britain had proposed peace, and the Spanish Minister was bearing the terms and would present them to Washington at camp. (27). This, however, turned out to be just rumor. It did indicate the degree of importance placed upon the visit.

The key figure was to be the French Minister. He disclosed to Washington during his stay that the French were prepared to increase the flow of supplies in order to aid further the Americans in their Revolution. (28). Of even greater importance, Girard proposed that Count D'Estaing's fleet would again cooperate with the Continental Army, and this time the fleet was put entirely at the disposal of General Washington. The possibilities of a truce leading to peace negotiations were also discussed but nothing came of it.(29).

The visit and meetings were a great success. On May 5, after having left Middlebrook, Girard wrote Washington praising his fine Army. He hoped that the visit had been the beginning of a closer link in American-French relations, and as it turned out, it was.(30) General Greene had described M. Girard as "one of the politest men you ever saw."(31) Greene expressed the success of the occasion well when he said the

Minister seemed "to be much pleased with what he had seen." (32)

Indians Visit Camp

Later in May, another delegation of important visitors came to camp. The Delaware Indians sent representatives to Congress and on their way they stopped at Middlebrook where they were greeted by Washington and made welcome. These were a friendly people, but they did not go unwarned as to the dangers of becoming hostile to the American cause. Washington reminded them of the Indian Expenditure that had recently left camp. (33). The Indians presented a Memorial to Washington reiterating their friendship for the American cause, and Washington held a review in their honor on May 14.(34). Elijah Fisher also made note of this event in his little diary. He wrote that "the King of the Ingens with five of his Nobles to attend him come to Headquarters to Congrattulate with his Excelency." (35).

There were other personages in camp also. Governor William Livingston of New Jersey was a frequent visitor. He came often to discuss military practices and their relation to the welfare of the citizens of New Jersey.(36). On April 16, General Sullivan came to spend about a week as the guest of General Arthur St. Clair. During his stay he discussed with General Washington and others plans for the coming Indian Expedition.(37). Benedict Arnold, who was soon to take his place in the history of the Revolution, visited camp on February 8, 1779, arriving from his stay among the Tories of Philadelphia. He was not much impressed with Camp Middlebrook, and he wrote to his financee in Philadelphia that he hoped soon to return from "t h e s e few dirty acres." Arnold thought it a "villainous" plan, peopled by "villainous men."(38)

For the officers, at least, life at Middlebrook was most interesting. Besides the frequent visits of important people, there were many parties and celebrations, both small and large. The greatest of these was the celebration of the first anniversary of the French Alliance at Pluckemin on February 18. But this was only one of many such diversions.

Dr. Thacher, for instance, celebrated his New Year's Eve with the "gallant Virginians." First, Thacher and many of his fellow officers had dinner at Colonel Gibson's. Then the party shifted to General Muhlenberg's quarters for supper and dancing till 3 o'clock in the morning. (39). During the Christmas season, Dr. Thacher did "not have a day without receiving invitations to dine, nor a night without amusement and dancing" at Middlebrook.(40).

Thacher's fellow officers at camp were just as busy. Major Robert Forsythe, General Greene's aide-de-camp at Middlebrook, wrote Greene (in Philadelphia at the time) on January 27:

> We had a most agreeable hop last evening — present [were] Mrs. William Livingston, Miss [Cornelia] Lotts, Miss [Harriet] Van Horn, and Miss Betsy Livingston. General Wayne, Cols. Bid-

dle, Livingston, Butler, Williams, (and) Scammell were there. . . We kept it up till 4 in the morning.(41)

Many of the unattached daughters of the local gentry were present at all of the parties given by the military at Middlebrook. Some were even present at a "house warming" given by a Lieutenant of the Artificers, helping him celebrate the completion of his hut on January 12.(42).

While many officers at Middlebrook felt deprived of the season's amusements to be had at Philadelphia, the capital of the country, they made the best of the situation. Some frequently met their friends from Philadelphia halfway. Parties were given in Trenton, New Jersey, where many in camp met their Philadelphia friends. On April 14, General Greene noted that his wife attended one of these fetes. She went to a "Tea Frolick given by Betsy Pettit." Present were a "number of Ladys from Philadelphia, and some members of Congress." (43)

With such a busy social life among the officers in camp, and including many of the local belles, some romance entered the picture. Colonel James McHenry, Washington's aide, courted Harriet Van Horne, the daughter of Philip Van Horne. Only the breaking of camp ended the budding courtship.(44). With such diversions, the officers were pleasantly entertained in their off-hours. They made the most of the hospitality offered by the gentry of Somerset County.

The enlisted men at camp were not so fortunate. They had to provide their own entertainment to while away their spare hours. They were of necessity given to plainer amusements than were the officers. Their favorite outlet was drinking. When General Washington forbade the selling of liquor in camp, early in the encampment, another means of obtaining liquor had to be found. Some made their own; others, less ingenious, attended local "tipling houses" near camp such as Stelle's Tavern. Such places were off limits, but it was almost impossible to keep the men away. On January 1, General Smallwood ordered that "the officers of the day will. . . forbid tipling houses in. . . the vicinity" of camp.(45). Though outlawed, the taverns continued to flourish.

Women Camp Followers

Other diversions for the enlisted men were also found. Like all Army camps, Middlebrook had its entourage of camp followers. These promiscuous women and stragglers followed wherever the Army went. When the Army was ordered to prepare to march to Middlebrook, Washington warned:

"The officers are to see that the Soldiers and Women who March with the baggage do not transgress the General Orders made for their government. They will likewise secure all stragglers."(46) So the women followers marched to Middlebrook with the Army and remained throughout the encampment. These women lived on the fringes of camp, the soldiers building shelters for them and

providing food and other necessities.

The women added an extra burden to the already overtaxed Quartermaster Department. They became a real problem to the Army, and Washington was at a loss as to how to cope with it. On April 21, he tried checking on where the "extra" rations disappeared to:

> As the daily issues of Provisions exceed, considerably, the total number of the Troops in this Camp, I wish to know on what days, in what manner, and by whose orders the Provisions are drawn, especially for the use of the Artificers, Wagoners, and various staff. You will be pleased to add the number of rations issued to the women in camp.(47)

When Pennsylvania, in April, finally supplied its soldiers and officers in camp with food and clothing, President Joseph Reed warned: "I hope the officers will see that no improper persons are borne on the returns." (48) When camp broke in June, the women again showed up where they were not officially wanted. General Greene complained on June 7 that the much-needed "waggons is [sic] loaded with women and lazy idelers." (49) Thus, the enlisted men protected and cared for these women followers, and the Army, as always, was powerless to prevent it. Probably these women did provide some moral support and entertainment to sustain the often dejected soldiers. But in order to exercise a control over the pent-up emotions of the men, a strict discipline was needed.

Many guilty of robbery were put in irons and fed a diet of bread and water.(50). For the most part, though, robbery at Middlebrook was punishable by whipping, varying from 50 to 200 lashes depending upon the severity of the crime. On June 1, Private William Scully was tried for entering and robbing the house of Robert Dennins and stabbing William Cox with his bayonet. The soldier was sentenced to receive 100 lashes at the head of his regiment (the 1st Virginia) as an example for the rest of the men.(51). On a similar occasion in April, a sergeant and six privates of the Light Corps were tried for entering and robbing three houses in the vicinity of camp. Their punishment was to receive 100 lashes for each house robbed. The first 100 lashes per man were administered at the head of the entire newly-formed Corps on the parade grounds.(52).

Crime in the Army at Middlebrook was not only limited to enlisted men, however. Very often officers and those high in the chain of command had to be punished for military and civil infringements of the law. On April 5, Hugh Smith, Postmaster for the Army, was tried for precipitating a riot involving himself and a number of soldiers. Smith had agreed to judge a cockfight, a common pastime at Middlebrook, and when his decision was disputed he pulled out his sword and attempted to enforce it himself. He was forced to resign his commission and leave the Army (53).

A high official of the Commissary Department at camp by the name of Lewes was

charged with "embezzeling and selling public stores without proper order." The court-martial before which he appeared acquitted him, but Washington, upon discovering that Lewes had by his own testimony purchased the liquor ration from the artificers and sold it for a profit, reversed the decision of the court and dismissed Lewes from the Army.(54).

The most serious of all crimes in the eyes of the Army was that of desertion. Many deserted while at Middlebrook, and Washington was forced to set an example. On April 14, three men of the 1st Maryland regiment were tried for desertion and were sentenced to death by hanging.(55). These and two others previously sentenced to die were to be hanged on April 20. On the morning of the 20th, with the entire camp watching, the five men were "brought in a cart, sitting on their coffins, and halters about their neck." When they reached the gallows, a messenger hurried up with news that Washington had pardoned three of them "trembling on the verge of eternity." The others were hanged in full view of the Army.(56).

Others were sentenced to death afterward, but most were pardoned. Some were not, and these unfortunates were executed. Desertions continued at a great rate despite the examples used, and Washington sought vainly for a means of preventing them. On April 22, Washington extended for another month his proclamation offering amnesty to all deserters who rejoined their regiments.(57) Even this lenient measure met with failure, for few if any rejoined the Army.

As has been noted, General Benedict Arnold was a visitor at camp. April 20 was set aside at Middlebrook as the day of the trial of the General on charges brought against him by the Pennsylvania Council. General Arnold was then stationed near his fiancee in Philadelphia. He had been charged by the Council the previous year with "appropriating the public waggons of the state to private uses."(58) The trial had been continuously postponed, and Arnold grew impatient at the delay, demanding that he be tried and his name be cleared. All of his fellow general officers were in sympathy with Arnold, including Washington. A few days before the 20th, the trial was again postponed till June 2 at Middlebrook because all the witnesses were not available.

On June 2, Washington was again forced to postpone the trial because "the situation of Affairs will not permit a Court Martial to proceed. . . at this Camp."(59) Arnold meanwhile grew more restless at the abuse he was forced to endure. In the eyes of General Knox, Arnold was undergoing an unjust castigation. He wrote to his brother:

> You will see in the papers some highly colored charges against General Arnold, by the state of Pennsylvania. I shall be exceedingly mistaken if one of them can be proven. He has returned to Philadelphia, and will, I hope, be able to vindicate himself from the aspersions of his enemies.(60)

In the ensuing months, Arnold was finally acquitted of these charges, but the damage had been done. His sensitive pride had been injured once again, and the way had been further opened to the course of events that led him to treason and dishonor.

But General Arnold's troubles were only a minor thorn in Washington's side at this time. He had more immediate and pressing problems demanding his attention. Due to a serious lack of new recruits, the Army had dwindled in number while at Middlebrook. Washington warned Congress that the states had fallen down badly in recruiting new troops, and that the Army was in poor shape in this respect. The situation at Middlebrook was made worse because such great numbers had to be sent on the Indian Expidition, and "all the Virginia Levies are of necessity, to be sent to the Southward."(61)

Re-enlistment Bounties

In order to attract re-enlistments among those veterans whose terms were up, various means were used. The most common method of keeping those already in was to offer bounties in the amount of $200 cash, or new clothing, or both (62). Another inducement was to offer the veteran a long furlough—up to three months—if he stayed in The Army grew smaller and smaller, despite these measures, and by April it had reached its lowest point. Washington vainly sought action from Congress, but his pleadings fell on deaf ears.(63) Because the Army was so weakened, furloughs were severely curtailed, except where re-enlistments were promised Washington ordered that no furloughs be granted "but where the circumstances of the case are of a very peculiar and pressing nature."(64). Still the Army shrank. Finally, on March 9, 1779, Washington ordered all those on furlough to report back before May 1.(65).

The Army had dwindled from 8,875 enlisted men in January to 7,029 by the beginning of April, a decrease of almost 20 per cent (66). This number would have been smaller yet if the number of men on sick call or on furlough were also subtracted. With the recall of the soldiers on leave, however, the ranks again began to fill up. By the end of April "the soldiers which were on furlough [sic] . . . are now coming in so fast, that hutts cannot be found for their reception."(67)

Those who did remain in camp all winter often suffered, sometimes from real injustice, and more often from fancied slights. This was especially true among the officers. Due to a reorganization of the Army in September, 1778, there was a great deal of dispute over rank at Mddlebrook. Seniority among officers of the same rank depended on the date of their commission, and it was this that was often in question. It became almost impossible for Washington to promote anyone out of the order of seniority even though personal qualities may have justified such a promotion. "Irregular" promotions, as Washington was prone to call them, were out of the question. When asked about it, he replied that he would not indulge in it as he wanted no "fresh causes of disgust add-

ed."(68) Officers became discontented due to real or fancied injustices to them on this score. According to Washington, they were spreading their discontent to others, and "possibly the seed of Sedition."(69)

The officers of the Maryland line especially were torn by rank disputes. Smallwood became alarmed when these disputes affected the efficiency of his division. On January 3 he was forced to warn those officers who refused to carry out their duties because they had grievances of this nature.(70) Resignation from service became one way of satisfying a hurt pride. When Colonel Mordecai Gist was promoted to Brigadier General, Colonel Thomas Price resigned his commission in the Maryland line on February 24.(71) Colonel Josias Carvel Hall warned that he would not serve while General Smallwood commanded the Maryland troops.(72). Colonel Otho Williams of the Maryland line was unhappy over an injustice done him by Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Ford and threatened revenge. He commented that "the little Fellow has behaved unworthily." (73)

Finally, on March 1, General Washington stepped in to arbitrate the differences among the officers of the now seething Maryland line. The Commander would appoint a commission to examine all grievances in the division, and meanwhile, General Smallwood begged "the officers to have [sic] all their scruples for a few days, and comply with their duty."(74) Soon after Washington handed down a decision and settlement. He hoped that all concerned would accept it and "not leave the service."(75)

This settlement, however, did not soothe the ruffled feelings of the officers, and the board of general officers chosen to settle the argument met again in April. Still the dispute was not settled, and the division was in a state of flux when it left Middlebrook in June.(76)

The officers of the Pennsylvania line were dissatisfied for a far more substantial reason. These men were in actual want. During the severe snowstorm of December 28, General Wayne found that "the wretched and truly destitute situation of the officers begs all description. They never experienced such cruel neglect from their own state."(77) A week later Wayne warned President Reed that unless the Pennsylvania officers received the same purchasing privileges and services that officers of the other lines received, and the promise of half pay after leaving the service, wholesale resignations would result. (78).

In a letter to a member of the Pennsylvania Council, the vitriolic and outspoken Wayne warned:

> You are now sailing in the wide sea of Politicks forgetting that there are yet poor half starved naked fellows in the field. . . We shall make an attack in force upon you in February with our claims and grievances drawn up in form.(79)

Before such an "attack" could be formed, Wayne resigned his

command of the Pennsylvania troops, and General St. Clair took over. At this point the situation was made worse among the officers by a "new arrangement" of rank among them(80). This only added new fuel to the fire. The men repected and loved Wayne. Colonel Craig claimed that the men and officers "felt lost" without him.(81)

The "attack" that Wayne had threatened got under way on March 6. The officers of the line formed a committee to seek redress of their grievances. They communicated with the Pennsylvania Council and threatened to "unanimously resign their commissions by the 15th April" unless something was done to relieve their wants. (82) A scant week later their long overdue and justifiable threats were answered. They were granted half pay following the War and proportionate prices (according to the fluctuations of the currency) for all necessities.(83)

The officers of the Delaware regiment at camp were subject to much the same injustice that beset the Pennsylvanians. They waited much longer than the Pennsylvanians before seeking benefits due them. Finally, on May 16, the Delaware officers petitioned the Delaware General Assembly. They too threatened to resign their commissions. They claimed their pay was "insufficient to support us as officers," and asked only to be "put on equal terms with officers from other states, for if past Services entitle them to the favour, we undoubtedly have a right to a similar claim."(84) Thus, the Delawarians used the same approach that worked so well for the officers of Pennsylvania.

Of the four state lines at Middlebrook, only Virginia was punctual in fulfilling its obligations. General St. Clair said of the Virginians at Middlebrook:

> The troops of Virginia are also supplied with necessaries at very low prices, and, at this very time, broadclothes and linens are sold in camp to their officers, at as low a price as they could ever have been purchased for; besides, they are now making up their paybooks for six months' pay, a present from the State as some compensation for the depreciation of the money. This difference alone, would sufficiently account for the dissatisfaction that so generally prevails in the Pennsylvania line(85).

Though the Virginians were so well taken care of, their line was "more deffective in organization and equipment than any other state contingent."(86) Baron von Steuben, upon an inspection in late spring, reported that each brigade was greatly undermanned, and recommended changes which were immediately carried out. General Stirling, in command of the line, concurred, and the three Virginia brigades were reduced to two.(87)

There was some dissatisfaction also among the additional units at Middlebrook. There were 98 artificers in camp.(88)

These were the maintenance men. All the repairing and re-

building — and there was a great need for it among the Continentals — was done by them. On March 6, the same day as the Pennsylvanians, the artificers also drafted a petition to General Greene and to Congress setting forth their grievances. They were dissatisfied because they belonged to no state line. Their commissions were irregular, their pay in proportion to the worth of the currency was low, and there was no provision for half pay for them after the War." (39) They too threatened to resign **en masse** unless the grievances were redressed.

Express Riders 'Agrieved'

The express riders also used the newly-discovered weapon — the petition — to seek better standing. There were 17 express riders working out of Camp Middlebrook, and they were essential to the war effort. The riders were commanded by Joseph Dunn, a local resident. On February 22 they petitioned Greene, lamenting that they were "much agreived [sic] by the extortions of the public." They were so aggrieved that their feelings would only be soothed if Greene agreed to "raise our Wages to Eight Dollars per day;" otherwise, they could not "perform the several duties enjoined upon us."(90) All but Joseph Dunn signed the petition. Whether their pay was raised is unknown, but if they were as fortunate as the others, we may assume they were given an increase.

By May 18, Washington was at the end of his rope. Little wonder, after all the dissatisfaction he had faced, and his futility in attempting to combat it:

> I have never yet seen the time in which our affairs in my opinion were at so low an ebb as the present and without a speedy and capital change we shall not be able in a very short time to call out the strength and resources of the country. The hour therefore is certainly come when party differences and disputes should subside, when every Man (especially those in Office) should with one hand and one heart pull the same way with their whole strength.(91)

Ironically enough, the health and morale of the rank and file at Middlebrook was at its peak. On March 8, Caesar Rodney, President of Delaware, visited camp. Upon reviewing the Delaware regiment, he pronounced it "rather healthy than otherwise," except, of course, for the plight of the officers (92). Even General Washington — so pessimistic about the future — wrote to Lafayette in France: "The American Troops are. . . in a more agreeable, and fertile country, than they were last Winter at Valley Forge, and are better clad and more healthy than they have been since the formation of the Army."(93) It certainly was a paradox that the men were comparatively so well provided for and the officers in such dire straits as to threaten to resign from the service.

Life at Middlebrook had its hardships, just as it had its rewards. The life of the officer was unduly agonizing due to the

poor showing of most of the states in supporting their divisions. On the other hand, the enlisted men had much to be grateful for in comparison to previous encampments. For all it was a day-to-day existence, and the uncertainty of the morrow led many to excesses they ordinarily would not have indulged in.

The Continentals lived each day to the fullest, as is characteristic of the soldier in wartime. Their entertainment, their amusements, their whole way of life typified this feeling, and we can at best be but inadequate critics of their way of life. If at times they seemed frivolous, they probably earned the right. If they complained, they certainly had cause.

CHAPTER SIX

The Artillery Park at Pluckemin

The Artillery brigade of the Continental Army constituted a separate unit within the regular Army. In 1778, there were three battalions attached to the Army. They belonged to no state line, and they were not a part of the Continental chain of command. They, and their general, Henry Knox, were subordinate only to the Commander-in-Chief, General Washington. Since they were an individual unit they had little in common with the regular Army. Their functions and drills were peculiarly their own. They did not encamp for the winter with the Continentals at Middlebrook but set up their Winter quarters about seven miles away at Pluckemin. Here they stayed throughout the winter, building barracks, drilling, and generally fending for themselves. There was little fraterniing between the artillerymen and the main body of troops, the one exception being the gala celebration of the first anniversary of the French Alliance in February of 1779.

Of the three battalions, two were from Pennsylvania and one from Virginia. The two Pennsylvania battalions were commanded by Colonel John Lamb and Lieutenant-Colonel Ebenezer Stevens. The Virginia battalion was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Forest. Each was dependent on its state for support, and so their sources of supply were the same as those of the Continentals. This seems to have been the only instance of dependence the Artillery would admit of. They lived, worked, and drilled according to their own regulations, and this independence was heightened by the fact that Washington gave Knox a free rein in administering his corps as he saw fit.

The Artillery Camp was just southwest of the town of Pluckemin, on the right side of the road to Veal Town, now Bernardsville. Sergeant Halsey, on an errand for General Greene, noted in his diary that "we left our Quarters at Mr. Bogart's [see map] . . . and proceeded on our way from thence to Pluckemin, keeping the Park of Artillery on the right. . .on our way to Veal Town" (1). More specifically, the Park itself, according to a later source, was located on the northwest side of the farm belonging to Cornelius Eoff.(2) General Knox stayed the Winter at the home of Jacobus Van der Veer, below the Bedminster Church, about two miles from camp(3).

The Artillery Corps left its camp at Fredericksburg at the end of November with the Pennsylvania Division. When the Pennsylvanians were held up by British movements, the Artillery hastened the march and arrived at Pluckemin on December 7

(4). Upon their arrival, General Knox immediately ordered them to begin work on their barracks. "All the carpenters wheelrights [sic] and joiner to join the Artificers and be constanly employed with them during the time of building the barracks."(5) The other men were divided into messes of 12 each, and were lkewise "daily employed at work upon the barracks."(6) They worked from "troop beating [7 a.m.] . . . till 1 o'clock," in the afternoon, and after an hour for dinner, back to work till "half and hour after 4 o'clock."(7)

As the weather grew colder, it became more difficult to keep the men at work on the much-needed barracks, and so Knox ordered that the Commissary issue a gill of rum per man to everyone in the brigade(8). By the 15th of December, each man was receiving two gills of rum a day(9). Despite the inducement of liquor, the men continued to shirk their work on the buildings, and Knox ordered his adjutants to report any man not working who was supposed to be.(10) As more detachments arrived at camp, they too were put to work. Most of the men were still in their ragged tents the day after Christmas, when a severe snowstorm added to their discomfort. General Knox entreated: "The necessity of having the Barracks compleated is urgent and calls for the greatest exertions."(11) By the 30th, there were at least 200 men working on the shelters. But for a serious shortage of shoes, more would have been at work.

On January 10, Knox wrote General McDougall that he had been "engaged in building barracks for my poor rebels in mourning," but that they had just "got into their barracks which are comfortable and on an elegent plan." He added that he was "in quarters comfortable and clever."(12) The barracks which the Artillery had built were indeed "elegant" as compared to those at Middlebrook. They were not huts, but real barracks, spacious and built of boards — not logs — each with a large fireplace and chimney (13). The barracks were well laid out:

> The huts of this corps are situated on a rising ground, at a very small distance from the road, and unfold themselves in a very pretty manner as you approach. A range of field pieces, mortars, howitzers, and heavy cannon, make the front line of a parallelogram; the other sides are composed of huts for the officers and privates. This military village is superior in some respects, to most I had seen . . . although it is no more than the work of a few weeks(14).

Even British intelligence reported that the rebels "have built good Barracks at Pluckemin for a large number of Troops."(15). At the beginning of February another battalion arrived at Pluckemin, and a "new line of barracks" were built. They were completed in a few days, and on February 3, the new troops moved in(16).

Though the barracks were completed, there was still some building to be done. On March 23, General Washington ordered that a signal be erected "upon

the Mountain in the rear of Pluckemin." The beacon was to be built of logs in the form of a pyramid, 16 to 18 feet square at the base, and 20 feet high. The signal was then to be filled with brush so as to be easily ignited in case of attack. It was visible from Middlebrook(17). In addition to the signal, a guard of 120 men and seven officers was placed strategically around the outskirts of camp(18).

The troops at Pluckemin were subject to the same discomforts incurred through shortages of necessities as the Continentals at Middlebrook. As has been noted, the men were short of shoes. On December 26, 100 pairs were distributed in camp but these were not enough(19). The next day Knox asked General Stirling if he could spare any from Middlebrook.(20). Unfortunately, none could be had. Those on hand were needed for the troops going to the southward, and whatever were left were put aside for the Indian Expedition.(21)

On December 19, Colonel Thomas Proctor of the Corps of Artillery, representative of his command, requested President Reed of the Pennsylvania Council to answer the pleas of the Pennsylvania Artillery. He begged:

> Ought not the Officers and men be furnished with the Stipend of Cloathing as granted to the rest of her Troops as well to be furnished with the monies to fill the Battalion with its proper complement of men. . . . The honourable house take knowledge of the distress of the Officers of said Battalion, that of clothing and direct measures suitable to their present necessities. (22).

But the Artillery was not part of the regular Pennsylvania line, and the Council was not even taking care of these; Colonel Proctor was ignored. Finally, on March 19, the men of the Pennsylvania brigades at Pluckemin did what their fellows at Middlebrook were doing — they petitioned the Pennsylvania Council. Unless they received clothing and privileges commensurate with their station, the officers of the Pennsylvania Artillery would resign(23). Evidently, their pleas, along with those of the Pennsylvania line at Middlebrook, were answered, for they did not resign. Again, the threat of such action was sufficient to stir the lethargic patriots at home to activity.

There was also a shortage of food in camp. Aside from wanting meat and bread, Knox complained, "indeed we have a scarcity of little necessaries — such as sugar, chocolate, etc." (24). This despite the fact that the contingent at Pluckemin was relatively small. The number of troops at Pluckemin varied as as they did at Middlebrook — from a high of 675 able-bodied men in December to a low of 507 in April(25).

Because there were comparatively few men at Pluckemin, they were better equipped with quarter-master's supplies and camp equipage. There were 101 camp kettles, or one for every five men, 251 knapsacks, or one for every two men. The artillerists had at Pluckemin 152 axes, one for every four men; this

might explain the rapid completion of their barracks — the fact that they had more tools to work with(26).

Since General Knox was also in charge of the Ordnance Department, the Ordinance Depot for the Army in Jersey was at Pluckemin. Ammunition and arms were stored in "the stone church" near camp, and no less than eight sentinels were posted there at all times.(27).

Knox blamed the terrible deficiency in his department on the public and the Army's purchasing agents, and wished vainly for enough shot "for the purpose of knocking peoples brains out" for not properly equipping the Army(28). In order to help conserve the ammunition on hand, he forbade any firing of small arms within two miles of camp, unless on guard duty or with permission of an officer. Every guard had to account for his ammunition after he came off duty. Ammunition was meanwhile being made and repaired by 30 men in the "laboratory" at Pluckemin. (29) In all, there were 60 cannon at Pluckemin, in the charge of the Artillery brigade.(30).

General Knox was very lenient when it came to disciplining his soldiers. He was probably too lenient, and his charges came to learn that Knox was hesitant to inflict punishment even in the most extreme circumstances. The soldiers in camp were warned a number of times about cutting down trees near camp for firewood, but no amount of warnings had any effect, and the trees near camp continued to disappear.(31) The General Knox was fond of praising those of his brigade who carried out their duties well, but often he carried this practice to such extremes that he became almost maudlin, even in his writings, and this had a serious detrimental effect on the discipline of his brigade.(32)

Finally, on February 9, Knox's leniency was put to a most severe test. An undetermined — but evidently large — number of men in camp mutinied. They would not obey their sergeants and higher officers, refused to work, and soon grew restive and dangerous. A show of force put down the mutiny, but such an occurrence presented an ominous note for the future conduct of his troops.(33). Two men were tried the next day for inciting the mutiny, and both were found guilty. One of them was sentenced to death, and the other was to receive a hundred lashes. Four days later, the soft-hearted Knox remitted the sentences, and both men were sent to join their companies, with Knox's warning that

> mutiny is a crime of so aggravated and dangerous a nature, as to place the Criminal almost beyond the reach of Pardon and should there be any more instances of this. . . the general declares the offender shall be punished with the most exampiory [sic] severity.(34) (34).

Several times after this date, Knox was extremely hesitant to punish his troops, and when he did, he again remitted the sentences. As a result, disci-

pline remained at a dangerously low ebb throughout the encampment. The officers, whose authority was subverted, and who were themselves unhappy for more personal reasons, could barely control their men. Violations became more numerous and open. On May 21, Knox finally had to admit his mistake publicly, and he pronounced a drastic change in disciplinary policy. He noted that

> of late there have been more men confined for a violation of duty than has heretofore been known in the Corps and that in some instances where he [General Knox] has remitted punishment it has not produced the good effects he was in hopes it would.

Therefore, Knox threatened, he would become "stricter" in the future. Knox also "enjoined the Officers of every rank to have a most watchful eye on the men . . . as it certainly s a reflection on the conduct of the officers."(35) Certainly the conditions at Pluckemin, while they were not good, were better than at Middlebrook. That discipline and morale were in such poor state could only be attributable to the General and his officers.

A good part of the lack of proper spirit in camp was a result of Knox's policy of allowing the officers to live out of camp, away from their men. Unlike Washington, Knox was not at all insistent that the officers rejoin their men. As one officer put it, they were "indulged with the liberty of lodging out of camp."(36) When adequate quarters were available in camp, Knox did no more than casually mention that the officers should join their men. Field officers were altogether exempted from residence, as "no barracks are ready for them."(37).

Every Sunday religious services were held at the "Academy" — the heart of the camp. Officers were conspicuous by their absence from these services, and Knox ordered that they attend or be disciplined. Although attendance was required, the officers still stayed away, and despite warnings, nothing was done about it. (38)

The Academy where these services were held was the center of the camp. Here all major activities were held. It was not a new building, having been erected sometime before the Army arrived at Pluckmin, but it was such a convenient center that the encampment was built around it. The Academy

> was raised several feet above the other buildings, and capped with a small cupola, which had a very good effect. The great room was fifty feet by thirty, arched in an agreeable manner, and neatly plastered within. At the lower end of the room was a small enclosure, elevated above the company, where the preceptor of the Park gave his military lessons.(39)

The "preceptor" referred to an instructor in mathematics who lectured at the academy six days a week for the benefit of the officers in camp. General Knox had invited a Mr. Colles, the preceptor, to lecture in the hope that:

> The officers of the Corps will by those means have an opportunity of acquiring a more particular and extensive knowledge of their Profession and making themselves better qualified to discharge the duties of their respective stations. The general expects that they will apply themselves in good earnest to the study of this so essential and necessary branch of science. The duty they owe themselves — a regard for their own reputations and just expectation of their country, the general hopes will induce every officer to pay the closest and most diligent attention.(40)

Despite General Knox's high hopes, attendance at the lectures was very poor.

With discipline among the officers at such a low ebb, it is little wonder that the men were so restive and rambunctious They violated all rules of conduct in seeking out their amusements, and violations of Army regulations were more flagrant and open than they ever were at Middlebrook. Liquor flowed freely among the men in camp, and it was not only sold outside of camp. It was discovered in February that some of the barracks in the rear of camp were operating as tipling houses, and liquor could be had — and was sold — at these barracks to any soldier in camp with money enough to buy. General Knox threatened and warned that "such a pernicious practice" would not be tolerated, and ordered that if his officers found liquor in any of the huts, they should "immediately destroy it and set fire to the hut"(41).

Gambling a Problem

The soldiers also liked their cards. Gambling or "gaming" as it was called, was common at Pluckemin. The men also held frequent cockfights. More common was the practice of playing cards for money. Again, General Knox could not ignore this violation. He noted on January 9 that the "pernicious practice of gaming particularly at cards prevails among the soldiery." (42). He vaguely threatened that if "any soldier, artificer or waggoner shall hereafter be detected of this crime they shall be immediately punished with the utmost severity."(43) The practice continued till camp broke in June, and little was done to prevent it.

One thing that the men in the corps did pride themselves on was their cleanliness. General Knox insisted — and he was generally obeyed in this respect — that all the men "come on parade in the morning with their hats cocked, shoes blacked, faces shaved and hair combed and tied up. The men who mount guard must be powdered."(44) The camp was extremely clean and well kept(45). After their hours on duty, however, the men changed their personalities.

"Taptoo" beat at 8 o'clock, and signified the transformation from a clean and proud corps to a ragged and rather wild, undisciplined mob. There was, as has been seen, a very active night life at Pluckemin (46). During the day, though, the men drilled faithfully as a

unit six days a week, from 9 to 11 in the morning. In the afternoons, after the barracks were completed, they were divided into battalions and exercised in their specialties. The officers were to "learn perfectly" the drum beat for all maneuvers (47). Both extremes of Army life were much in evidence at Pluckemin.

As for General Knox, he was a conscientious and humane officer. He was proud of "his boys," and felt a great personal responsibility for each of them. The fact that he commanded a relatively small unit made such close attention to individuals possible. Personally, he was a humble man — we should note that whenever he referred to himself, "General" was always written with a small letter. Perhaps all these things led to his inordinate leniency with his men. At any rate, his writings indicate a strong sense of his own weakness and humility fallibility.

During the early and very cold part of the Winter, the General and his officers were for the most part isolated at Pluckemin. Knox himself found it "prudent to stay at home" during the cold spell, and refused invitations from his fellow generals at Middlebrook. He wrote Lord Stirling on December 27, after refusing an invitation to Stirling's quarters: "As soon as I can make my poor boys comfortable. . . I will in Sleigh fly to pay my respects to you."(48) As of January 10, after being more than a month at Pluckemin, he had not met once with General Washington(49).

Early in February, Knox left Pluckemin and went to visit Congress in Philadelphia to see if he could pressure them into getting "the ordnance department better regulated," by supplying more ammunition and cannon for the Army. He stayed there till the end of February, returning only for two days on the 17th to participate in the celebration of the first anniversary of the French Alliance held at Pluckemin on February 18 (50).

The Anniversary Celebration

The celebration, a high spot of the encampment, was held at the academy at Pluckemin. The hosts for the anniversary celebration were General Knox "and the officers of the Artillery." (51). The occasion was the first anniversary of the French Alliance with America. The Army had cause to celebrate, for it had already reaped much of the fruits of the Alliance, and was to benefit more in the future. In attendance at Pluckemin, according to Dr. Thacher, were "General Washington and his lady, the principal officers of the Army and their ladies, and a considerable number of respectable ladies and gentlemen of the state of New Jersey."(52)

In preparation for the grand occasion, General Knox ordered that

> the men are all to be clean dressed, their hats cocked, coats hooked back and their hair braided and turned up behind and powdered. The General desires the officers to see that none of the men are absent on that day and that these orders respecting their appearance are complied with in their fullest latitude(53).

A picked crops was drilled and put through maneuvers early in the afternoon of the 18th. At 4 o'clock, 16 cannon were discharged, marking the beginning of the festivities. An "elegant dinner" was served to all the guests, and they were then treated to a display of fireworks(54). Following the fireworks, the officers of the Artillery Corps provided entertainment. They had erected a "temple" of 13 Corinthian arches, representing the 13 states. The set was in all perhaps 100 feet long, and 15 or 20 feet high; each arch held paintings "emblematic of the Revolution." With this backdrop, the officers of the Artillery acted out skits lampooning the British and Tories. Following the entertainment, toasts were drunk all around, and the ball was officially opened by General Washington and Mrs. Knox dancing a minuet(55).

The ball itself was described by General Knox: "We had about 70 ladies all of the first ton in the State, and between 300 and 400 gentlemen. We danced all night — an elegant room." He continued: "Everybody allowed it to be the first of the kind ever exhibited in this state at least." (56). The celebration was the highlight of the season for the officers of the Army, and the residents of the neighboring areas. If a guest list were available, we might find on its rolls the names of some prominent patriots of the state and their families.

Though separated, life at Pluckemin differed very little from life at Middlebrook. Perhaps the troops of the Artillery were a little better provided with the bare necessities and were also a little wilder, but their routine of work and drill (and probably boredom) was essentially the same. The officers, isolated as they were, were not as active socially as their fellows at Middlebrook, but they were the center of attraction at the greatest social gathering in many years in New Jersey, and this compensated somewhat.

The routine of Army life ground along for the soldiers despite such diversions as mutiny and celebration. Still, the troops at Pluckemin were able to provide their own good times, and they probably felt a sense of regret when they left camp on June 3, under the "cover" of the Maryland Troops, and began a new campaign(57).

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Martial Spirit

Because Middlebrook was a military encampment, certain measures were necessary to secure the safety of its inhabitants. The general staff was in constant fear of an enemy attack. The fear proved groundless, but it dominated the planning of defensive measures nevertheless. Pickets were posted at strategic outposts throughout New Jersey. Signals were erected in order to warn all the various components of the Army and the State Militia in the event of an enemy raid. Camp Middlebrook itself was easily defended. After a number of defensive measures it was made almost impregnable — at least according to the British.

There were other considerations necessary to the military welfare of Middlebrook. The long-delayed Indian Expedition against the Six Nations was planned and launched from Middlebrook. An intelligence service, requiring the use of spies and counterspies, kept Washington informed as to British movements and intentions. The Continentals were in turn victims of espionage themselves. Life in camp was not without its excitement and martial attitude. Baron Steuben spent much time drilling and training his troops. Among other military accomplishments was the formation of the now famous Light Corps, also organized by Baron Steuben and commanded by "Mad Anthony" Wayne. Finally, preparations were in the making for the breaking of camp and the beginning of another campaign. This too occupied a good portion of the time and energies of the officers and men.

The Army had been distributed throughout several states during the Winter of 1778-1779 for reasons of supply and because there was so much territory to defend. This dispersion of forces was dangerous, and Washington knew it. Middlebrook itself was in danger, Washington felt, because of the dispersal. Soon after arriving in camp he complained: "I have had so many demands upon me from quarters exposed to the Enemy. . . that I cannot spare any more without leaving this cantonment [Middlebrook] in so weak a state as to be liable to insult during the Winter."(1)

Every move the British in New York made was carefully scrutinized. Staten Island was considered a good embarkation point for a possible British attack on Middlebrook. On January 27, Greene learned that "last evening . . . the enemy had brought a number of the troops to Staten Island and were making preparation to cross to Jersey." Guards and pickets were doubled that night,

and Elizabethtown was hurriedly preparing its defenses. Greene himself felt that the troops at Middlebrook "Will fight hard to defend their hutts."(2)

On Feruary 18 — the night of the celebration in honor of the French Alliance — Washington knew that he was most vulnerable. In addition to the usual patrols, he took additional preparations. The guard at the hospital at New Brunswick was strengthened, and additional guards were placed at Bonhamtown and South Amboy (3). Washington's Life Guard was sent to Perth Amboy as an additional precaution.(4). Probably because of the added security, nothing happened. As the number of troops in camp diminished, however, Washington grew worried. Some left on the Indian Expedition, others were sent southward. Washington had hoped the militia would fill the gap, but they were slow to respond. (5). This unexpected circumstance served to heighten Washington's fear of an attack on Middlebrook.

The British, meanwhile, had explored the possibility of finally trapping Washington and his Army. They were discouraged by the strong position the Continentals occupied. Their intelligence reported that the Army lay

> at the west end of a long narrow valley [sic] between two mountains, which extends about 10 miles in length. Mordecai's Gap is situated at the east end of this Valey; it is a narrow pass through which goes the road from Boundbrook to Morristown. There is no other way of getting into the vale but with difficulty, except along a road which runs by the side of Middlebrook; at the place it enters the mountain is a bridge, which if taken up or destroyed makes it in an instant impassable for both men and horse. The ground is very strong both on the north and south side of this vale. In it the Rebels were encamped and hutted formerly. . . . The mountain is high and strong, next the Rariton, not easy of access in the front anywhere.(6).

The British military command back in England, meanwhile, was growing impatient with the failure of its troops and the costly Hessians to end the rebellion. Clinton was urged to attack and drive Washington from Middlebrook, but the cautious General, knowing better the strength of Washington's position in Jersey, felt an all-out attack to be foolish. He reported on May 14, 1779:

> To force Washington to an action upon terms tolerably equal has been the object of every Campaign during this War; the difficulty of attaining that object in so strong a country, even with the Force Sir William Howe had, by this time needs no illustration. Washington has at this instant 8,000 Continental Troops in Jersey besides the Militia. . . . I believe the Force, with which your Lordship seems to apprehend that I might drive Washington fro mhis present position and oblige him to retire to the Mountains is in my idea by no

means equal to the task . . . . If he persists in keeping his present post [at] Middlebrook I must not flatter myself that it will be easy to gain any advantage over him, or carry into exten . . . the maneuvers which your Lordship appears to command.(7).

General Clinton restricted his offensive to frequent raids into Jersey, attacking the fringes of Washington's Army, and quickly retreating. Such action, though effective, was not conclusive enough to the impatient British powers who sought a fast, devastating end to the rebellion. One such raid was undertaken on February 26 in an attempt to surprise the American garrison at Elizabethtown. Probably the attack met with more success than the Americans cared to admit, but Dr. Thacher claimed that "the vigilance of the general [Maxwell] prevented their success." (8)

A favorite target of the British raiders was Monmouth County. On April 26, a British party landed at Red Bank and fell upon Lieutenant-Colonel Ford and a detachment of 6th Maryland troops. Outnumbered, the Americans retreated. The militia of the area was as usual slow in responding, and the British succeeded in destroying property and capturing much-needed livestock(9). On one such raid, the Americans managed to capture a small vessel previously captured from the French named "The Mary Snow." Thoughout the Winter and Spring, British foraging parties roamed almost at will throughout Monmouth County, however.

The Americans too considered a possible Winter offensive. On December 29, with General Washington in Philadelphia, Lord Stirling, in command at Middlebrook, thought he saw his opportunity. The British in New York and Staten Island had been weakened by a shortage of food and a consequent breakdown of morale. The freezing weather had made the Hudson River a sheet of ice. Stirling wanted to cross the Kill Van Kull on the ice and attack the British on Staten Island. There they could not be supported by the troops from New York nor could they retreat, for the River on the other side of the island had not yet frozen completely. Washington, though, would not approve the scheme.(10). Washington felt that the "garrison. . .. will be of sufficient strength to repel any attack that we can make." (11)

Defense Secured

The American troops during the early part of the winter were busy securing their defenses. Baron DeKalb, in command of the Maryland line, planned and directed the building of the defenses for Camp Middlebrook. How much of his ambitious plan was actually put into operation is unknown, but his designs were fivefold:

> 1st — At or near the top of the mountain at the place called Lincoln's Gap a strong redoubt with some pieces . . . of canon, to command the wooden Bridge on Bound Brook and the roads leading along the top of the

mountain, behind the camp as far as Wayne's Gap with a sufficient number of troops to stop the enemy.

2ndly — A parapet to be constructed b e l o w the mountain for about — men, nearer the bridge to defend the same with small arms.

3rdly—The Fording places, below or above said Bridge, could be obstructed with either ditches, abatis or Cheveaux de Frize, only on the right or both Banks of the creek, to secure the passages.

4thly — To repair an old Batterie at Bound Brook very judiciously laid out for four pieces, commanding both the Bridge on Raritan River and the stone bridges upon the creek.

5th — To have a kind of gate in the form of Cheveaux de Frize on the nearest Stone Bridge, Rariton Bridge not wanting any, because it may be broken off in the middle for any length(12).

Ten pieces of artillery were sent to Middlebrook from Pluckemin on January 27 to implement the planned defenses (13). In addition, the defenses on the Delaware River were strengthened by General DuPortail, thus further securing the defenses of New Jersey(14). With these preparations, Middlebrook was certainly safe from any large-scale attack the British might have undertaken that winter.

In order to secure better the various military components in New Jersey and provide for the safety of the inhabitants as well, pickets w e r e thrown out throughout the state. First, pickets were naturally placed at key spots around Middlebrook itself There was a sergeant's guard of 48 men stationed at Bound Brook; lesser guards were posted below Bound Brook Bridge and near Van Veghten's Bridge. The other two were composed of Maryland troops. On December 29, Lord Stirling ordered that pickets be posted all along the Raritan to Amboy. He ordered General Maxwell at Elizabethtown to post pickets as far down as Rahway, thus forming an unbroken chain of guards from Camp Middlebrook to the post at Elizabethtown(15).

A week earlier, an advance picket consisting of a captain and 50 men was sent to Bonhamtown(16). A month later, toward the end of January, the picket at Morristown was also increased to a captain's command of 50 men(17). These were to be relieved monthly. Lesser patrols were stationed at Woodbridge, Shrewsbury, Middletown, Trenton and Tinton Falls. The number and size of the pickets placed throughout the state indicate the fear the Continentals held of an enemy attack.

These pickets served another function besides security. The picket at Tinton Falls in Monmouth County in January was sent to break up the illicit trade functioning there between New Jersey and New York. The North Carolina brigade stationed at Paramus served a similar end on the other side of the state(18). As the black market trading grew more pronounced, Stirling was forced to send a larger detachment to Monmouth, and 250 men were even-

tually permanently stationed throughout the county (19).

A series of warning signals was devised by Lord Stirling and General Washington to aid in calling out the militia and spreading the alarm throughout New Jersey. Early in March, Washington ordered that, under the direction of Stirling, signals be built on "conspicuous Hills and Mountains which appear. . . to be judicious and well disposed."(20) On March 23 construction was started. The Virginia troops began work upon signals at "Steel's Gap and the Hill upon Baskenridge Road." Maryland troops built signals at "Wayne's, Lincoln's and Quibbletown Gaps." Troops from the Pennsylvania line were "to proceed to a remarkable Hill near Princeton to erect a beacon there."(21).

Other alarm posts were constructed in Essex, Bergen, and Hunterdon counties. The signals that were most commonly constructed were tall (perhaps 15 to 20 feet high), obelisk-shaped structures, and were filled with dry brush. When the alarm was sounded, these signals would be lighted, and the ensuing blaze could be seen for miles around. The initial alarm to set the signals blazing was the discharge of three pieces of cannon from General Stirling's headquarters near Middlebrook(22).

Washington's Spies

Another means of securing both the camp and the whole of New Jersey from British depredations was the use of spies. Washington was a great believer in the cloak and dagger method of warfare, and frequently he sent money himself to useful agents, for the most part operating in New York City. His best agent was "S. C" (Samuel Culper) in New York. Culper went under the alias of Aaron Woodhull, and he lived as a Tory aristocrat near the British headquarters in New York. Washington directed that Culper (or Woodhull), pay special attention to the movements of the British fleet, and the Commander was forever seeking more direct means of communication with his agent(23). The most effective contact between Washington and Culper was Benjamin Tallmadge, the head of the American Secret Service. He channeled his information through Bergen County.

Washington desired most information on naval and land strength, "what is going forward," preparations, and the conditions of wagons and horses (24). To gain his ends, Washington continually sought new sources of information. On May 3 he wrote Elias Boudinot, one of New Jersey's revolutionary leaders, and asked Boudinot to secure the assistance of Lewis Pintard, a resident of New York, who Washington felt could be useful. Washington sent with Boudinot's agent a newly prepared invisible ink that disappeared after use and could not be brought to light except by the application of a counterpart liquid possessed only by General Washington. This "ink" was allegedly invented by James Jay, brother of John Jay, the president of the Continental Congress(25).

In recruiting new spies, Washington had to beware of the "double Spies" as he called them. Upon occasion someone

would volunteer himself as a spy, but Washington could never be sure of his fidelity One such case occurred on May 25, 1779. Elijah Hunter, living in New York, had volunteered himself to Washington. After much deliberation, Washington decided to use him, but cautioned that he should know as little as possible of the situation of the Continental Army(26).

Soon Washington grew to be very skillful in the use of the cloak and dagger method He often sent deliberately false spy letters, to be distributed by his own "double spies" or counter spies, containing true — but often misleading — information (27). But just as Washington and his Army used spies, so were they spied against. One British spy was operating right in the Continentals' midst, and the General never discovered it. Isaac Ogden, who came from a very prominent and otherwise patriotic family living near Middlebrook, was operating as a British agent. His contact in New Jersey was a "Mr. Galloway" of whom nothing is known except that he was a British officer living incognito in New Jersey. Galloway reported the following to his headquarters in New York about Isaac Ogden on March 29:

> This gentleman [has] a brother living in Jersey near Washington Camp [Middlebrook] who is in the rebel secrets and constantly communicates with them, therefore his account of their numbers may be relied on.(28).

It is little wonder that the British always seemed to have such accurate information at their disposal concerning American forces.

One source of especially great concern to the British spies was the progress in the preparations for the projected Indian Expedition. The command of the Expedition against the Six Nations of the Iroquois was first offered to General Horatio Gates, who declined. General John Sullivan, in command at Rhode Island, was then placed at its head.

The skeleton outline of the operation framed at Middlebrook attempted to "carry the war into the Heart of the Country of the six nations; to cut off their settlements, destroy their next Years crops, and do them every other mischief of which time and circumstances will permit."(29) This was to be in retaliation for the depredations of the Iroquois on behalf of the British (and supplied by British arms), upon the settlers of the Mohawk Valley in New York, and the Wyoming country of Pennsylvania. Washington hoped for the "total destruction and devastation of their settlements."(30)

There is no question that the necessities of supplying the Expedition cut down the efficiency with which Middlebrook was supplied. The magazine at Morristown was especially burdened with the task of supplying two armies.(31) Cattle originally destined for Middlebrook from Lancaster County, Pa., were diverted for the use of the Expedition.(32) General Greene had the additional task of preparing magazines for 1,000 men each at Fort Pitt (now Pittsburgh),

and Sunbury (Pa.); both had to be completed by May 1, 1779(33).

4000 Troops on March

The expedition was to consist of 4,000 troops of the Continental line, plus "such aids of Militia as may be deemed absolutely necessary."(34) The Continental troops to march with the Expedition included the brigades of Generals Clinton, Maxwell, Poor, and Hand, and a detachment of troops from the Pennsylvania line stationed at Middlebrook. Late in April, General Sullivan visited Washington in camp to discuss the forthcoming expedition and remained for some days as the guest of General St. Clair.

Because so many troops stationed in New Jersey were ordered on the Indian Expedition, Washington informed Governor Livingston of New Jersey that many detachments of Continentals posted throughout the state would have to be recalled to the main Army at Middlebrook, as the dispersal of troops had weakened the camp(35).

As the Expedition got under way, many of the tribes sought to make peace with Washington, but the General, fearing a peace would last only so long as the threat of the Expedition remained, declined(36). The Indian Expedition was successful in that it did put an end to most of the Indian depredations in the hinterlands of the young country for the remainder of the Revolution.

The men who remained behind at Middlebrook, meanwhile, were not idle. With Baron Steuben in camp, the men drilled under his tutelage and learned the intricacies of maneuvering and parade. On April 27, Steuben was made Inspector General of the Army, and he was immediately assigned the task of drilling the men. He was given powers commensurate with his reponsibilities. In General Orders of May 4, Washington proclaimed:

> The Inspector General and officers in his department will visit the different Brigades in turn and must be answerable they do not deviate in the smallest point from the principles laid down and established in the regulations(37).

The "regulations" Washington referred to were General Steuben's "Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the United States," then in the last stages of completion. As a matter of fact, the manual was completed at Middlebrook, and as the final chapters were finished, they were transcribed by the officers and put to immediate use(38). Beginning April 12 the men drilled from 6 to 8 o'clock in the morning and 4 to 6 in the afternoon(39). Steuben's manual, which placed the drill in its most practical form, involved but little wasted energy for the soldier. Immediately after the morning drill, the officers themselves were assembled and taught the "different steps, how to dress, wheel and keep their distance with Precision."(40)

The Baron himself was "held in universal respect," according to Dr. Thacher. "He is distin-

guished for his profound knowlege of tactics, his ability to reform and discipline an army. . . the Continental Army has improved with great rapidity under his inspection and review." (41) Baron Steuben reviewed a bridgade with "a scrutinizing eye."

> [He] required that the musket and bayonet should exhibit the brightest polish; not a spot of rust or defect in any part could exclude his vigilance. He inquired also into the conduct of the officers toward their men, censuring every fault and applauding every meritorious action(42).

Though he spoke only French and German, his aides compensated for this defect. Together, they inspected the Army that Spring at Middlebrook thoroughly. Never before was the improvement greater, according to at least one commentator(43). He was praised by many. Governor Livingston saw "the eminent advantages which our Army has derived from your skill and assiduity in improving their discipline."(44) Steuben had even offered to train the New Jersey Militia against the day when the Continental Army would have to leave the state, but Livingston refused the offer(45).

Toward the close of camp the Baron held reviews of the state lines in order to show the improvement they had made under his instruction that winter. On May 14, the 1st Pennsylvania brigade was paraded. On May 17, the 2nd brigade performed. The Virginia brigades paraded on May 21 and 25. The last to parade were the Marylanders, who "showed their stuff" on May 27 and 28(46). All showed up well, and Steuben received the praise of Washington for the fine job he had done at Middlebrook.

It has been mentioned in another context that the Light Corps had been organized at Camp Middlebrook. Perhaps this was the greatest military accomplishment achieved during the period of encampment on the Middlebrook. Here too, Baron von Steuben's skilled technique was put to work. He undertook the task of organizing and training a corps of light infantry in April of 1779. The Light Corps, as it soon came to be called, was composed of picked troops — the best in the Army — from the ranks of the Continentals. The majority of the troops were chosen from among the Pennsylvanians, and there were some 2,000 men in all(47).

Wayne in Command

Command of the corps devolved upon Brigadier General Anthony Wayne of Pennsylvania. This brilliant, erratic leader had been in command of the Pennsylvania line until December, 1778, but had been without a command for two months until his appointment on February 28, 1779. The Corps, organized and trained at Middlebrook, was composed solely of troops drawn from the ranks at Middlebrook. Its general inspired a fierce loyalty and devotion in his charges, and within a very short time, a member of the corps was envied for belonging to the best unit in the Army.

An example of this loyalty is evidenced by the plea of Colonel Josiah Harmar, of the Pennsylvania Artillery at Pluckemin; on March 8, he offered to forfeit his rank tenure and even take a demotion if only he could serve under General Wayne in the new corps. (48).

And Harmar had made a good choice. The Light Corps fought with distinction for the remainder of the War, but perhaps they never reached the heights again that they reached at Stony Point in July, 1779. Just a short month after leaving Camp Middlebrook and taking the field for the first time, the Corps was asked to capture the seemingly impregnable British fortress at Stony Point. They accomplished the task without firing a shot — a testimony to the bayonet training they had undergone under Baron Steuben at Middlebrook. Certainly many felt with Colonel Francis Johnston of the Pennsylvania line that Wayne's command was "preferable to that of any in the Army."(49)

But the transition from Winter quarters to the field of battle required work. As Spring approached, the entire Army was more and more taken up with the task of preparing for the field and another campaign. Arranging to break camp, transport, and equip an army for the field was necessarily a great task.

General Greene set his plans in motion as early as April 15. On that date he ordered that supplies for the field be shipped to camp. He wanted all wagonmasters and conductors in camp by May 15 to start transporting camp goods. On April 17 Greene requested that all officers prepare for the field, "that they may be ready to leave their present quarters at the shortest notice."(50)

Greene requested that the officers practice their marching, so that they would be able to march "on foot. . . by their [men's] sides, by sharing he [the officer] will lessen every inconvenience and excite in them a spirit of patience and persevaerance."(51)

The greatest barrier facing General Greene in successfully moving the Army was his great shortage of wagons and horses. All the wagons that could be spared were ordered to camp, but by May 28, there were still not enough. The horses that had been sent out of camp during the Winter were ordered brought in from Pennsylvania and Delaware at great expense (52).

On May 18, the Indian Expedition had left camp, taking a good portion of the much-needed supplies, wagons, and teams.(53). Tents were distributed on May 27, and again Greene found that there were just not enough to go around. At the last minute — on May 29 — 10 brigades of baggage wagons were forwarded from Philadelphia, with some 500 teams in all, making it possible at last to move the Army(54). Washington wrote of the Army's difficulties:

> At the first appearance of a movement among the enemy, I redoubled my ef-

> forts to put the Army here in a state of readiness for taking the field. These have been seconded by the utmost exertions of the Quartermaster General; but the very great difficulty of procuring horses and waggons and the scarcity of forage have unavoidably retarded our preparations(55).

The horses that were unfit to travel were pastured once again with the inhabitants(56).

General Greene delegated the responsibility for breaking camp to his aide, Robert Forsythe. A Mr. Collis was placed in charge of the quartermaster stores that had to be left behind. This material was stored in the barns of many of the residents of near-by areas. Colonel Sidney Berry was in charge of the actual moving of the camp(57).

Washington foresaw that when his Army left Middlebrook, and the various other posts were moved, New Jersey would remain unprotected and fair game for the British in New York, but there was little he could do about it. On May 14, he warned Governor Livingston that the Governor had better see that "the Militia. . . be assembled in time, to prevent any inconveniences" from the departure af the troops(58).

On May 14, the exodus from New Jersey got under way. General Maxwell's brigade at Elizabethtown was ordered to March to Middlebrook to "receive further orders."(59) On May 29, General St. Clair was ordered to move the Pennsylvania Division to the heights between Springfield and Chatham "till further orders or till some enterprise of the enemy shall make a sudden movement necessary," such as an attack on the Hudson River posts(60).

The Virginia Division left on the 2nd to join St. Clair at Morristown. DeKalb led his Maryland troops to the rendezvous at Morristown the next day (61). By June 10, the entire Army was enroute towards West Point where an attack was expected momentarily (62). The General himself waited till every unit had left Middlebrook, and then he and his guard departed on June 3 "by way of Pluckemin and Morristown to Pompton."(63)

British intelligence reported on June 3 that "Mr. Washington's Army marches fast and by such different routs [sic] I cannot ascertain his numbers, but cannot make them above 5,500 men."(64) So successful was the American exit from camp that the British had no time to even contemplate an action. The degree to which the British were fooled by the maneuvers can be determined by the poor guess as to Washington's strength, for at least 10,000 troops marched from Middlebrook in the period between June 1 and June 3.

Another campaign was under way. The American troops had come fresh and ready from what was probably their most successful Winter encampment to date. The Army had been reorganized; they now had some system, some cohesion. The Quartermaster Department was functioning well despite many handicaps. The Medical

Corps at last had some semblance of organization.

The Light Corps, though untried, held high promise and, in general, the morale of the troops — in contrast to the previous year — was excellent.

The friendship between France and America had been cemented and implemented at Middlebrook.

It appeared, surely, that the Americans from this juncture were on their way to victory.

OFFICERS OF FIELD GRADE AT MIDDLEBROOK, 1778-1779

Commander-in-Chief

George Washington.

Major Generals

Baron Johanne DeKalb — Maryland Division.

Louis DuPortail — Chief of Engineers.

Nathanael Greene — Quartermaster General.

Arthur St. Clair — Pennsylvania Division.

Baron Frederick von Steuben — Inspector General.

James Alexander, Lord Stirling — Virginia Division.

Brigadier Generals

*Henry Knox — Commander of Artillery.

Peter Muhlenberg — Commander of 2nd Virginia Brigade.

Charles Scott — Commander of 3rd Virginia Brigade.

William Smallwood — Commander of 1st Maryland Brigade.

Anthony Wayne — Commander of 1st Pennsylvania Brigade.

William Woodford — Commander of 1st Virginia Brigade.

*Pluckemin

Colonels

Sidney Berry — Coordinator of Stores.

Abraham Buford — Commander of Hospital at New Brunswick — 11th Virginia.

Richard Butler — 9th Pennsylvania.

James Chambers — 1st Pennsylvania.

Thomas Craig — 3rd Pennsylvania.

William Davies — 10th Virginia.

Christian Febiger — 3rd Virginia.

John Gibson — 1st Virginia State Regiment.

Mordecai Gist — 3rd Maryland.

William Grayson — Grayson's Additional Regiment.

John Green — 6th Virginia.

John Gunby — 7th Maryland.

David Hall — Delaware Regiment.

Josias Carvill Hall — 4th Maryland.

Alexander Hamilton — Aide-de-Camp to Washington.

William Heth — 3rd Virginia.

Richard Humpton—10th Penn-Pennsylvania.

William Irvine — 7th Pennsylvania.

Francis Johnston — 5th Pennsylvania.

*John Lamb — 2nd Artillery.

James McHenry — Aide-de-Camp to Washington.

John Mehelm — Commissary of Hides for New Jersey.

Robert Moyan — 6th Pennsylvania.

Daniel Morgan — 7th Virginia.

John Neville — 4th Virginia.

Richard Parker — 1st Virginia.

Thomas Price — 2nd Maryland.
*Thomas Proctor — 4th Continental Artillery.
William Richardson — 5th Maryland.
William Russell — 5th Virginia.
Walter Stewart — 2nd Pennsylvania.
John H. Stone — 1st Maryland.
Tench Tilghman — Aide-de-Camp to Washington.
Otho H. Williams — 6th Maryland.
James Wood — 8th Virginia.

Lieutenant Colonels

Peter Adams — 7th Maryland.
Burgess Ball — 1st Virginia.
Robert Ballard — 4th Virginia.
William Butler — 4th Pennsylvania.
Samuel Cabell — 8th Virginia.
Richard Campbell — 1st Virginia State.
Morgan Conner — Hartley's Additional Continental Regiment.
John Cropper — 7th Virginia.
David Duer — 7th Pennsylvania.
Charles Fleming (to Dec. 15, 1778) — 8th Virginia.
Benjamin Ford — 6th Maryland.
*Thomas Forest — 4th Regiment.
Uriah Forrest — 1st Maryland — Dec. 1778.
Thomas Gaskins — 1st Virginia.
David Grier — 7th Pennsylvania.
Josiah Harmer — 6th Pennsylvania.
Robert Henry Harrison — Aide-de-Camp to Washington.

*Pluckemin.

Samuel Hawes — 6th Virginia.
Samuel Hay — 10th Pennsylvania.
Samuel Hopkins — 10th Virginia.
John E. Howard — 5th Maryland.
Adam Hubley — 10th Pennsylvania.
Charles Jennins — 2nd Virginia.
Francis Mentges — 5th Pennsylvania.
Caleb North — 9th Pennsylvania.
Charles Pope — Delaware Regiment.
Nathaniel Ramsey — 3rd Maryland.
Holt Richesan — 5th Virginia.
Thomas Robinson — 1st Pennsylvania.
Charles Simms — 2nd Virginia.
Samuel Smith — 4th Maryland.
*Ebenezer Stevens — 2nd Continental Artillery.
John Thornton — Grayson's Additional Regiment.
Richard Varick — Deputy Commissary General of Musters, Northern Department.
Gustavus B. Wallace — 11th Virginia.
William Williams — 3rd Pennsylvania.
Thomas Woolford — 2nd Maryland.

LIST OF CIVILIANS OF SOMERSET COUNTY EMPLOYED AS EXPRESS RIDERS FOR THE ARMY 1778-1779

Joseph Dunn, Chief, Joseph Burnwell, Nicholas Christopher, James Davis, Methusilah Davis, William Day, Robert Dunn, Isa-

ac Fitzworth, Noah French, Isaac Hemstead, John Long, David Lyon, M. Lyon, Joseph Marsh, Alex McCallister, Moses Ruften, John Turner.

Residents Who Rendered Services for the Continental Army at Middlebrook

Adam Alberger, butchering.
Alexander Brenan, carting tallow.
John Bruner, tending cattle.
James Burnett, carting hay.
James Brunsides, defenses.
Henry Cooper, driving cattle.
Thomas Curtis, carting salt.
Henry D'Camp, attending cattle.
Charles Dean, butchering.
John Deremus, victualing sick.
Albraham Drake, victualing soldiers.
James Dunham, driving cattle.
Daniel Dunn, carting tallow.
John Fisher, slaughtering cattle.
Jacob Flint, riding express.
Aaron Foreman, ?
Abraham Fowler, butchering.
John Garvins, butchering.
Arche Gifford, cooper.
D. Hagerman, carting flour.
Abner Hallfield, butchering.
Amanias Halsea, carting hay.
Amos Halsea, carting hay.
Daley Halsea, carting hay.
H. Hankinson, carting salt.
Benjamin Hinds, butchering.
John Hoppen, carting hay.
William Howell, driving cattle.
William Johnes, Superintendent of slaughterhouse.
Edward Lammon, carting salt.
Jacob Lappen, Drover.
Nathan Lion, carting hay.
Aaron Ogden, butcher.
Joseph Polles, taking in pork.
John Post, carting hay.
John Rogers, butchering.
Sam Ryder, butchering.
John Smith, butchering.
Moses Stiles, carting hay.
Thomas Throgmorton, carting salt.
Wess Tucker, carting spirits.
Nathan Turner, butchering for quartermaster department.
Parrot Van Deveer, carting to camp.
Cornelius Voorheis, driving cattle.
Thomas Washington, superintendent of butchers.
Samuel Woodruff, butchering.
Daniel Yongs, carting hay.

Residents Who Pastured Cattle on Their Property for the Army, 1778-1779

Samuel Ball, Timothy Brusten, Widow Budd, Lindsly Burnett, Jonas Carle, Alexander Carmichael, Silas Conduit, John Copperthwait, Compten Cutter, Thomas Darling, Jeduthan Day, John Deuman, Jonathan Ford, William Ford, Benjamin Foster, Robert Gold, Robert Gould, Cornelius Hairing, Benjamin Halsea, Isaea Halsea, James Higgens, Elijah Horton, Mathias Horton, Henry Howard, John Hutchinson, Phillip Huyler, Ebeneazer Lears, John Lloyd, John Logan, Ephriam Martin, Moses Martin, Samuel Meridith, Abraham Ogden, Thomas Osborne, Joseph Parrott, Edward Patterson, Nicholas Perrine, Benjamin Pierson, Amos Potter, Widow Richards, Benjamin Rieves, Jacob Sappen, Benjamin Shippy, Benjamin Shotwell, Daniel Smith, James Smith, Ely Squire, David Suthill, Jacob Tasellier, Wess Tucker, Abraham Van Gelden, Simon Van Ness, John Wheeler, Onesemus Whitehead, Samuel Wills.

Footnotes

CHAPTER I—The Selection of Middlebrook

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(2) **Ibid.,** p. 594.
(3) John C. Fitzpatrick (ed.), **The Writings of George Washington** (39 vols., Washington, 1931-1944), XIII, 75-76.
(4) **Ibid.,** p. 76.
(5) James McHenry Papers, photostat, 2nd series, I, 58, LC; Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Writings,** XIII, 179.
(6) Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Writings,** XIII, 179.
(7) Lord Stirling to Washington, Oct. 26, 1778, George Washington Papers, LXXXIX, 123, LC.
(8) **Ibid.**
(9) Washington to Royal Flint, Oct. 20, 1778, Washington Papers, LXXXIX, 5, LC.
(10) Return of Material Forwarded From Philadelphia to Middlebrook, Nov. 9, 1778, James Abeel Papers, NJHS.
(11) Nathanael Greene to Charles Pettit, Nov. 16, 1778, Miscellaneous Letters, Peter Force Transcripts, 6-H, 216:325, LC.
(12) Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Writings,** XIII, 180.
(13) James Abeel to Pettit, Nov. 23, 1778, James Abeel Letter Book 1778-1779, pp. 123-124, NJHS.
(14) Greene to Washington, Nov. 29, 1778, Washington Papers, XCIII, 143, LC.
(15) Greene to Pettit, Dec. 4, 1778, Nathanael Greene Papers, CL.
(16) Return of General Scott's Virginia Troops, Feb. 3, 1779, Nathanael Greene Papers, IX, 65, APS. Microfilm of this collection in RUL.
(17) Return of General Woodford's Virginia Troops, Feb. 3, 1779, Greene Papers, IX, 76, APS.
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(19) Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Writings,** XV, 46, 128.
(20) Return of First Brigade of Pennsylvania Troops, Feb. 2, 1779, Greene Papers, IX, 101, APS.
(21) Return of Second Brigade of Pennsylvania Troops, Feb. 2, 1779, Greene Papers, IX, 87, APS.
(22) Return of Maryland Troops, Feb. 17, 1779, Greene Papers, IX, 62, APS.
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(24) "Strength of the Several Departments," April, 1779, Greene Papers, XII, 58, APS.
(25) "The Diary of Joseph Clark," **Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society,** 1st series, vols. VII-VIII (1853-1859), p. 109; James Thacher, **Military Journal of the American Revolution** (Hartford, 1862), p. 157; Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Writings,** XIII, 323.
(26) "Joseph Clark Diary," **op. cit.,** p. 109.
(27) Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Writings,** XIII, 291, 374.
(28) **Ibid.,** pp. 325-326.
(29) **Ibid.,** pp. 362-365ff.
(30) Sir Henry Clinton to Lord Germaine, Dec. 17, 1778, Sir Henry Clinton Papers, CL.
(31) James Mitchell to Abeel, Dec. 13, 1778, Abeel Papers, NJHS.
(32) Thacher, **Military Journal,** p. 157.
(33) Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Writings,** XIII, 374.
(34) Anthony Wayne to Joseph Reed, Dec. 28, 1778, Anthony Wayne Papers, Bancroft Collection, II, 197, NYPL.
(35) Lord Stirling's Journal, Oct. 1778-Feb. 1779, William Alexander Lord Stirling Papers, IV, 97, NYHS.
(36) Cortland Skinner to Clinton, Dec. 10, 1778, Sir Henry Clinton Papers, CL.
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(41) **Ibid.,** pp. 220-221. (42) **Ibid.,** p. 351.
(43) **Ibid.**

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(29) "Road from Mr. Ten Eyck's towards Germantown, past the Clothier General," Erskine Maps, no. 70A, RUL.
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(56) Brigade Orders, April 13, 1779, Smallwood Orderly Book, HSP.
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(58) "From near Head Quarters where the Road goes to Dikins Mills towards Woodills Tavern, and goes from the Road surveyed from Woodills Tavern to Mathew Toniks on the east side of the Branch," Erskine Maps, no. 71C, RUL.
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(60) Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Writings,** XIV, 389.
(61) Beatty to Greene, Feb. 17, 1779, Greene Papers, IV, 5, APS.
(62) Bishop Meade, **Old Churches, Ministers and Families of Virginia** (Philadelphia, 1857), pp. 19-20.
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CHAPTER III—The Problems of Supply

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(2) Abeel to Biddle, Dec. 14, 1778, Abeel Letter Book, pp. 139-140, NJHS.
(3) Wayne to John Van Nest, Jan. 16, 1779, Anthony Wayne Papers, VI, HSP.
(4) Greene to ———, Jan. 27, 1779, Green Papers, VIII, 7, APS.
(5) **New Records of the American Revolution, The Letters, Manuscripts and Documents Sent by Lieutenant General Sir Charles Stuart to his Father 1775-1779** (n.p., n.d.), p. 96.
(6) Lord Stirling's Journal, Dec. 23, 1778, Stirling Papers, IV, 97, NYHS.
(7) Steiner (ed.), **Life and Correspondence of James McHenry,** p. 26; Jeduthan Baldwin, **Revolutionary Journal,** p. 141.
(8) Jeduthan Baldwin, **Revolutionary Journal,** p. 142.
(9) Abeel to Phineas Randolph, Jan. 9, 1779, Abeel Letter Book, p. 164, NJHS.
(10) Major Robert Forsythe to Abeel, Jan. 23, 1779, Abeel Papers, NJHS.
(11) Robert Brown to Major Forsythe, Jan. 29, 1779, Greene Papers, VIII, 10, APS.
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(13) James Thompson to Greene, Feb. 24, 1779, Greene Papers, IV, 100, APS.
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(15) Sparks (ed.), **Correspondence of the American Revolution,** II, 271-275.
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(17) **Ibid.,** XIV, 410.
(18) Timothy Pickering to Greene, Feb. 26, 1779, Greene Papers, II, 67, APS.
(19) Furman to Greene, May 19, 1779, Greene Papers, VII, 41, APS.
(20) General Varnum to Greene, Jan. 13, 1779, Greene Papers, II, 228, APS.
(21) Robert Hooper to Greene, Feb. 18, 1779, Greene Papers, IV, 42, APS.
(22) Thacher, **Military Journal,** p. 161.
(23) Smith (ed.), **The St. Clair Papers,** I, 465.
(24) General Clinton to Lord Germaine, Jan. 11, 1779, Sir Henry Clinton Papers, CL.
(25) Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Writings,** XIV, 56.
(26) Greene to Pettit, Jan. 2, 1779, Greene Papers, CL.

(27) Samuel Hazard (ed.), **Pennsylvania Archives** (138 vols., Philadelphia, 1852-1949), Series I, VII, 237.
(28) Greene to John Jay, April 12, 1779, Greene Papers, CL.
(29) **Ibid.**
(30) Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Calender,** II, 907.
(31) Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Writings,** XIV, 412.
(32) **Ibid.,** XV, 98.
(33) Colonel Udney Hay to Greene, Feb. 16, 1779, IV, 62; Cox to Greene, Feb. 26, 1779, II, 35; Pettit to President of Treasury Board, May 19, 1779, V, 28, Greene Papers, APS, are examples.
(34) Cox to Greene, Feb. 26, 1779, Greene Papers, II, 35, APS.
(35) Greene to Joseph Reed, April 15, 1779, Joseph Reed Papers, NYHS.
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(37) Sparks (ed.), **Correspondence of the American Revolution,** II, 271-275.
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(39) Joseph Reed to Pettit, May 23, 1779, Greene Papers, V, 60, APS, is a good example.
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(52) Azariah Dunham to Blaine, Feb. 6, 13, 1779, Ephraim Blaine Papers, II, 2069, 2071, LC.
(53) Furman to Greene, May 10, 1779, Greene Papers, VII, 61, APS.
(54) British Spy in Somerset County to Governor Franklin, Feb. 3, 1779, America Series, Bancroft Collection, I, 93, NYPL.
(55) Royal Flint to Blaine, May 5, 1779 Papers, XV, 2101, LC.
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(58) Flint to Blaine, March 2, 1779, Blaine Papers, II, 2080, LC.
(59) Abeel to Greene, Feb. 20, 1779, Greene Papers, IV, 3, APS.
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(61) Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Calender,** II, 880.
(62) Stirling to Governor Clinton, Jan. 7, 1779, New Jersey Letters Collection 1770-1779, RUL.
(63) Wadsworth to Blaine, Feb. 13, 1779, Blaine Papers, II, 2071, LC.
(64) Charles Stewart to Thomas Jones, Jan. 28, 1779, New Jersey Letters Collection, RUL.
(65) Asa Worthington to Greene, Feb. 16, 1779, Greene Papers, VIII, 110, APS.
(66) Royal Flint to Washington, April 20, 1779, Washington Papers, CIV, 31, LC.
(67) Smith (ed.), **St. Clair Papers,** I, 462.
(68) Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Writings,** XIV, 422.
(69) Wadsworth to Blaine, Feb. 13, 1779, Blaine Papers, II, 2071, LC.
(70) Washington to Greene, Feb. 17, 1779, Greene Papers, IV, 101, APS.
(71) Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Calender,** II, 89; Regimental Orders, April 29, 1779, Colonel John Lamb's 2nd Regiment Continental Artillery Orderly Book, Nov. 30, 1778-May 30, 1779, 2 vols., NYHS.
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(73) Stirling to Washington, Dec. 30, 1778, Washington Papers, XCV, 46, LC.
(74) Furman to Greene, May 7, 1779, Greene Papers, VII, 41, APS.
(75) Clement Biddle to Greene, May 27, 1779, Greene Papers, V, 83, APS.
(76) **Ibid.**
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(80) Francis Wade to Greene, Jan. 27, 1779, Greene Papers, II, 233, APS.
(81) William Finee quoting Clement Biddle to Greene, Feb. 17, 1779, Greene Papers, IV, 21, APS.
(82) **Ibid.**
(83) Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Writings,** XV, 29.

(84) Abeel to ————, Dec. 15,·1778, Abeel Letter Book, p. 143, NJHS.
(85) Robert Patterson to Robert Hooper, May 17, 1779, Greene Papers, V, 8-12, APS.
(86) James Mitchell to Greene, May 10, 1779, Greene Papers, VII, 52, APS.
(87) Forsythe to Greene, May 17, 1779, Greene Papers, V, 7, APS.
(88) Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Writings,** XV, 70.
(89) Biddle to Greene, May 27, 28, 1779, Greene Papers, V, 83, 91, APS.
(90) Abeel to Greene, Feb. 13, 1779, Greene Papers, VIII, 3, APS.
(91) Return of Material Forwarded from Philadelphia, Oct. 27, 1778, Abeel Papers, NJHS.
(92) Colonel Chase to Greene, Feb. 9, 1779, Greene Papers, IV, 13, APS.
(93) General Parsons to Greene, May 24, 1779, Greene Papers, VI, 3, APS.
(94) Returns of Camp Equipage, Feb., 1779, Greene Papers, X, 66, 69, 76, 87, 98, 99, 101, APS.
(95) Greene to Mitchell, May 23, 1779, Greene Papers, V, 66a, APS.
(96) Hooper to Abeel, Dec. 20, 1778, Abeel Letter Book, pp. 151ff., NJHS.
(97) Samuel Ogden to Abeel, Dec. 22, 1778, Abeel Papers, NJHS.
(98) Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Writings,** XIV, 372.
(99) Sparks (ed.), **Correspondence of the American Revolution,** II, 271-275.
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(103) **Ibid.,** XIV, 367-368.
(104) **Ibid.,** pp. 400-401.
(105) Public Archives Commission, **Delaware Archives,** II, 1036-37.
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(107) **Ibid.,** p. 161.
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(109) Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Calender,** II, 899; Smallwood to Washington, Jan. 7, 1779, Washington Papers, XCVI, 12, LC.
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(114) **Ibid.,** XIV, 100.
(115) Public Archives Commission, **Delaware Archives,** II, 1035.
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(117) William Finnee to Greene, Feb. 21, 1779, Greene Papers, IV, 21, APS.
(118) Stirling to Washington, Dec. 25, 1778, Washington Papers, XCV, 21, LC; Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Calender,** II, 905.
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(4) Colonel Scammell to Anthony Wayne, Jan. 14, 1779, Anthony Wayne Papers, VI, 57, HSP.
(5) **Ibid.**
(6) Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Writings,** XIII, 479; Brigade Orders, Jan. 17, 1779, Smallwood Orderly Book, HSP.
(7) Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Writings,** XIV, 70.
(8) Brigade Orders, March 6, 1779, Smallwood Orderly Book, HSP.
(9) Entry 28, Inventories of Damages by American and British Troops 1776-1782, NJSL; Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Writings,** XV, 29.
(10) Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Writings,** XIV, 185.
(11) Greene to Wayne, Dec. 19, 1778, Wayne Papers, VI, 39, HSP.
(12) Greene to Jeremiah Wadsworth, April 14, 1779, America Series, Bancroft Collection, II, 297, NYPL.
(13) **Ibid.**
(14) Deposition of Abraham Van Nest, March 9, 1779, Washington Papers, C, 12, LC.
(15) Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Writings,** XIV, 99.
(16) **Ibid.,** pp. 370-371.
(17) Entry June 22, 1779, Zephaniah Halsey-Archibald Ramsey Diary, pp. 4-5, NYHS.
(18) British Spy in New Jersey to Governor Franklin, Feb. 3, 1779, America Series, Bancroft Collection, I, 93, NYPL.
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(22) **Ibid.,** pp. 185-186.

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(24) Abeel to Greene, May 23, 1779, Greene Papers, V, 68, APS.
(25) Dr. Binney to Major Storey, May 19, 1779, Greene Papers, V, 42, APS.
(26) Dr. Binney to Greene, May 10, 1779, Greene Papers, V, 39, APS.
(27) **Ibid.**
(28) Dr. Binney to Major Storey, May 19, 1779, Greene Papers, V, 42, APS.
(29) Stevens (ed.), **op. cit.,** I, 117-3.
(30) Abraham Lott to his nephew, Jan. 13, 1779, John Nielson Papers, RUL.
(31) "Purchases and Expenses for the American Army May 1778 to Jan. 1779 Inclusive," Azariah Dunham Account Book, Dunham Papers, RUL. See Appendix.
(32) Azariah Dunham to Ephraim Blaine, Feb. 6, 1779, Ephraim Blaine Papers, II, 2069, LC.
(33) "Purchases and Expenses for the American Army," Dunham Account Book, Dunham Papers, RUL.
(34) **Ibid. See Appendix.**
(35) Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Writings,** XIII, 404-405.
(36) Greene to Captain Brown, June 2, 1779, Greene Papers, VI, 13, APS.
(37) Greene to Colonel Sidney Berry, June 3, 1779, Greene Papers, VI, 12, APS.
(38) Fitzpatrick (ed.), **Writings,** XV, 210.
(39) **Ibid.**

CHAPTER V—Life at Middlebrook

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